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An Empirical Analysis of the Contagion Risk in the Stock 
Markets: Evidence with E-GARCH VaR Model 
Song Gao    MSc Risk Management    4202651 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines contagion risk among both current Eurozone Crisis and Asian Crisis in 
1997 with daily stock prices during the crisis periods. Three types of financial markets are 
included to check the risk spillover, which are developed countries (G7 group), emerging 
countries (BRICs countries) and benchmark countries (Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland 
for Eurozone Crisis, while Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand for Asian Crisis). E-GARCH 
(1, 1) VaR model with Generalized Error Distribution (GED) is applied for each stock index 
for evaluating the volatility. Also, Granger Causality test is used to check whether there exists 
risk spillover. It is found that there is statistically significant evidence of contagion effect 
contagion risk among both current Eurozone Crisis and Asian Crisis. 
Keywords 
Contagion Risk; E-GARCH Modelling; Value-at-Risk (VaR); Backtesting; Granger Causality 
in Risk 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the recent decades, global markets are interacted increasingly through close financial links. 
When a financial crisis happens, it would hard-hit the banking system by rapidly transmitting 
from one market to another and finally arriving at the global markets. This phenomenon has 
become significant, especially for recent financial crises. 
A great deal of practical studies have concerned on the probability of market movements. 
Large market movements can be resulted in various reasons, such as policy changes, uncertain 
future, terrorist attacks, and risk spillover from other markets (Hendricks et al., 2007). These 
extreme negative events may cause large capital movements among the markets. Global 
financial markets have interactions and inter-linkages with capital movements. When negative 
downside event comes, interactions and inter-linkages would bring the risk spillover to 
correlated markets through the capital movements. The US sub-prime mortgage market crisis 
happened at the end of 2007, and it swept the banking system and quickly transmitted to the 
global financial markets. The effects of the crisis were automatically reflected in the rest of 
the world economies (Rigobon, 2002). Current Eurozone Crisis also supports the argument 
that the outbreak of the Greek financial crisis caused the large market movements of other 
European countries. Hence, it is necessary to identify whether current Eurozone debt crisis 
shows contagion or interdependent effect on the stock markets. If there does exist contagion 
effect, how the contagion risk spread and influence different markets would be an interesting 
topic to explore. Furthermore, if the financial crisis occurred in emerging markets and spread 
to developed markets, studying whether the contagion risk still has the same magnitude could 
help to make risk management to avoid contagion risk in different markets. 
Regardless of concern over the recent financial crises, rare studies have analysed contagion 
risk among both developed countries and developing countries (Blundell-Wignall and Slovik, 
2011). The difference in financial markets may lead to uncertain results on contagion effect. 
Hong et al. (2004) illustrate the how specific market shifts are transmitted to other countries 
in the stock markets that their study focuses on the contagion risk between Chinese, 
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American and German stock markets. In this dissertation, several questions would be studied. 
The existing literature presents a number of insignificant evidences on contagion risk among 
financial crisis (Dungey et al., 2005). Hence, whether stock markets show contagion or 
interdependence effects across countries is the first question to study, during the current 
Eurozone debt crisis in 2010. Additionally, the spreading way of contagion risk is worth 
paying attentions as well, which would help to understand the mechanism of risk spillover to 
better financial risk management. Then, it is interesting to check whether the developed 
countries would suffer the same contagion effect compared with emerging markets. Also, 
comparing with Asian financial crisis in 1998, this paper will research whether the contagion 
risk still make the same effects if the financial crisis occurred in emerging markets and spread 
to developed markets. At last, the research of risk causality in stock markets could provide 
new method for risk management. 
Based on current positions, Value-at-Risk (VaR) is selected to measure the risk. Jorion (2010) 
suggests that VaR has become a widely applied statistical approach to measure different risks. 
In this paper, two parts of empirical practices are presented, which are Eurozone Crisis and 
Asian Crisis. Three groups of samples comprise this research that developed countries (G7 
group), emerging markets (BRICs countries) and benchmark countries (Spain, Portugal and 
Greece for Eurozone crisis in 2010, while Indonesia, Korea and Thailand for Asian financial 
crisis in 1998). E-GARCH (1, 1) VaR model with Generalized Error Distribution (GED) is 
applied to accommodate the samples to generate the contagion effect. Besides modelling the 
contagion risk, model validation is conducted by Unconditional Coverage Test (Kupiec) as 
well as Conditional Coverage Test (Christoffersen) to check if the selected model and 
distribution could fit all the samples. At last, Granger Causality Test will examine whether 
there exists contagion effect among the markets. 
In general, emerging market group is expected to more likely to be affected by the benchmark 
volatility than developed country group, due to the advanced financial system would protect 
developed countries themselves from the extreme downside shocks, but the developing 
countries might lack the financial strategy to defend the crisis. For this reason, an effective 
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financial system seems to be very meaningful. A key point of this study is to detect whether 
there exists regional effect within the benchmark groups, where regional markets with 
co-movements would affect or interact with others significantly in the benchmark groups.  
This study has identified significant contagion effects in the Eurozone Crisis as well as Asian 
Crisis. However, the results have some differences. There is strong evidence of contagion 
effect in the Eurozone Crisis. Indeed, emerging market group is more likely to be affected by 
the originator, which is the same as the assumption. However, developed and developing 
group in the Asian Crisis shows weak evidence for contagion risk, but the risk spillover in the 
benchmark group is significant. As a consequence, this study has found significant proof in 
the both crises that contagion risk does exist and spread when the extreme negative events 
come, and given explanation for this phenomenon 
The structure of this study is to review the literature on the correlated topics firstly. Then, 
methodology will be followed to construct the model for measuring the risk. Empirical 
analysis contains both Eurozone Crisis and Asian Crisis part. Further discussion will explain 
the questions mentioned before. Finally, conclusion and some suggestions would be given for 
further studies. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Contagion Risk 
Contagion risk defined as significant economic changes, in other words as market risks, 
would spread from one country to other countries. According to the definition of contagion, 
perhaps the best explanation comes from Dornbusch et al. (2000). They emphasize that 
contagion effect shows apparent increase in the cross market co-movement when a financial 
market suffers the negative shifts, and the asset prices or financial flows would move together 
within the markets correlated to this co-movement in a particular period. However, this 
presentation is under argument that risk spillover can be assessed easily by the presence (or 
absence) of mechanisms of actions to protect markets (Morales and Andreosso-O'Callaghanb, 
2012). Markwat et al. (2009) describe stock market contagion risk as a domino effect, where 
the local crisis would interact with external events to become more serious crashes. Baur and 
Schulze (2005) refer contagion as the specific co-exceed data, which could not be explained 
by the covariates with different quantiles. Generally, contagion could transfer either economic 
booms or economic crises throughout a geographic region. With the globalization of the 
economy in recent decades, this phenomenon appears in many financial crises increasingly, 
especially during the 2008 global financial crisis period. As a result, it is necessary to 
investigate the contagion effects among various countries. Understanding these effects would 
contribute to identify future trends of international financial markets and help the government 
to make polices.  
Usually, individual country integrates into the global financial markets by involving financial 
links like trades, forward and future contracts, options and derivatives. There are three main 
types for contagion links, such like trade links, financial links and competitive devaluations 
(Dornbusch et al., 2000). Furthermore, Allen and Gale (2000) identify that institutional 
linkages could pass the contagion effect. Dornbusch et al. (2000) emphasize both trading and 
financial links transmit the risk spillover by identifying contagion risk in the selected 
countries. A financial crisis which occurs in one country could make financial effects 
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exposure to the abroad by these links. More recently, some studies have pay attention to the 
linkages within international banking system due to the system could transmit the risk 
spillover to other financial institutions. If a financial crisis spread one market to another, these 
economies would be dragged into a downward spiral (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2012).  
Dungey and Martin (2007) introduce an empirical model to study the linkages between 
currency and equity markets of Asian Crisis in 1997. They provide statistically strong 
evidence on both spillover and contagion effects, since cross-market links are important to 
transmit the negative downside events. Consequently, the speed and scale of spreading 
contagion risk depends on the degree of the integration. The significance of the contagion 
effects would increase with the degree of integration (Chudik and Fratzscher, 2011). It can be 
argued that financial markets facilitate the spreading of real or common negative events. 
However, it is not the reason for contagion effect. Hence, to analysis contagion and 
interdependent effect of different financial market is very importance when suffering shocks. 
Financial crisis could be linked to internal economic weaknesses, as well as external shocks. 
The factors could be diverse, such as interest rate shocks, sudden reversal of capital flows, 
wars and so on. In a short time, the crisis would spillover to other markets due to regional 
integration or market interaction (Khalid and Kawai, 2003). As a result, a financial crisis, 
which happens in a specific country, could be attributed to various factors and spread to the 
correlated markets. One typical example is the Asian financial crisis from 1997 to 1999, 
which swept across Asian countries and caused huge loss. 
Some studies argue that contagion risk could be apparent with cross-market linkages when an 
individual country or several countries would suffer a financial crisis (Dornbusch et al., 2000). 
For example, the financial crisis in 2008 has swept the globe quickly. Iwatsubo and Inagaki 
(2007) give the evidence of significant contagion effects from the US market to the Asian. 
They find that as the headstream of this crisis, US market influence the transmission of 
information largely to foreign markets, in which the intensity of contagion shows greater 
significance during the crisis than after the crisis. Conversely, some opinions suggest that the 
sudden shifts, rather than the correlation increasing, in market expectations and confidence 
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determine the contagion (Corsetti et al., 1999). Dungey et al. (2005) support this argument 
that they research the co-movements in the equity markets of both Asia and Australia, which 
are mostly decided by interdependent linkages arising from common systemic factors. 
Though negative shifts produce more effects than positive ones, contagion effect is still 
insignificant (Menezes et al., 2006). Bae et al. (2003) emphasize that normal common factors 
and linkages between financial markets should be taken account into consideration before 
modelling the volatility of crisis. Other studies illustrate the similar arguments of contagious 
effect (Bekaert et al., 2005). On the other hand, contagion effect addresses the unexplained 
and unexpected negative downside events. Each financial market interacts with the global 
markets through financial links. If a financial crisis occurs in a country, trading would 
decrease sharply and investing capital would flow abroad. Hence, the scale of contagion 
effect would hinge on the degree of financial market integration. The higher the degree of 
integration, the more serious the risk spillover is (Dungey et al., 2010a). Besides the 
arguments, some studies show that heteroskedasticity on correlation coefficients would give 
conditional correlation coefficients of the volatility (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002), which leads 
the results to be biased. In other words, the independent results reflected by the tests are 
before the crisis but not the fact during the crisis. Similar findings can be seen in many other 
studies (Araujo and Garcia, 2013; Baur, 2012). 
Another famous example of contagion effect is Asian financial crisis in 1997. It started with 
failure in the currency markets of Thailand, since the Thailand government determined to no 
longer peg the local currency to American dollar. As a consequence, currency devaluations 
rapidly transferred across South Asia, which came with decreasing in stock markets, declines 
in import revenues and even government upheaval in the summer of 1997 (Baig and Goldfajn, 
1999). Comparing with high growth performances before, many countries were facing a 
recession. They had to invite the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to help them get out of 
recessionary pressures in the economies, as their domestic policies failed to respond to 
negative shifts. Although the Asian Financial Crisis was stemmed by financial intervention 
from the IMF and the World Bank, declines were inescapable across the global markets as the 
Asian economies slumped (Baig and Goldfajn, 1999). In this financial crisis, Indonesia, 
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South Korea and Thailand suffered the most effects. 
Contagion risk is considered to be the most important factor that Thailand transferred its 
shocks to other countries and caused the crisis. Some researchers point out that contagion risk 
is transferred by the channel of strong trades and financial linkages (Forbes and Rigobon, 
2001). Actually, the crisis seems to have contagion effects immediately on the neighbours in 
Asia at the beginning, after which it spilt over the global markets by the end of 1998. 
Nevertheless, it provides a testable hypothesis whether contagion risk or a consequence of 
common factors affecting the regional economies. 
2.2 Measure the Contagion Effect 
Many empirical studies aim to build models on contagion effect by measuring the changes in 
the relationships between the different capital markets. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) illustrate 
that the correlation coefficients are conditional on market volatility. They find significant 
market co-movements in the financial crises but these co-movements are viewed as 
interdependence before. The increased scale of existing linkages brings the contagion effect 
to other markets. Dungey et al. (2005) also emphasize that risk spillover could be regarded as 
new channels which open the ways to transmit the negative downside events. Bae et al. (2005) 
indicate that it is important to separate tranquil and crisis periods to research contagion effect 
by building threshold models. Markwat et al. (2009) apply ordered Logit regression to 
measure the local, regional and global events, which addresses that the global negative shifts 
are cumulated by local and regional extreme downside shocks. 
Regional market return and volatility determine the contagion, especially for extreme 
negative returns than for positive ones (Baur and Fry, 2009). Morgan (1994) first launched 
Risk Metrics system with the popularity of VaR. Morgan (1996) has developed 
methodologies for using Value-at-Risk (VaR) into a portfolio of financial instruments, as well 
as a detailed description of Risk Metrics and a benchmark for market risk measurement. 
Value-at-Risk (VaR), which defines as p% of loss, is a widely used measurement in risk 
management (Beder, 1995). As for VaR, it gives probabilities with specific loss amount, 
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which is simple to understand and relatively easy to back-testing. After Morgan (1994; 1996), 
the trend of studying the validation of the underlying statistical assumptions has increased. 
Why researchers interest in VaR is that it reflects each point of the tails estimated in empirical 
data (Angelidis et al., 2004). Additionally, VaR measures risk factors in a consistent way. It 
enables that the risk is assessed as a whole of portfolio risk (Hull, 2012). In other words, it 
has taken account of risk interaction with each other at the firm wide level. This explains the 
reason that VaR is widely used as in the financial markets (Fan et al., 2008).  
Hendricks (1996) generates three VaR models for the foreign exchange markets, while he 
also has tested twelve VaR assumption of normality. Nine criteria are used to evaluate model 
performance, but none of the assumptions shows superior performance. Then, Danielson 
(2003) proposes different VaR models as risk measures from both internal and external 
(regulatory) points of view. He demonstrates that the VaR measure may give misleading 
results which might even increase systemic risk. Similarly, Culp et al. (1998) state the 
weakness in existing VaR approaches. 
Venkataraman (1997) also estimates VaR values based on both the assumption of normality 
and the mixture of normal approach in the foreign exchange markets. Considering the 
traditional normality approach producing much more violations of VaR significantly than the 
mixture of normal approaches, the mixture of normal assumption has a better performance 
than the traditional normality assumption. They conclude that mixture of normal approach 
could account for fat-tailed data, which is a tractable approach to VaR. Particularly, Tsay 
(2005) analyses VaR calculation methods of stock market with both parametric (including 
extreme value theory) and non-parametric approaches. Some studies address that rare 
extreme events should model VaR with both unconditional and conditional concepts of 
extreme values, which could help to understand the risk measure (Hendricks, 1996). 
The study of Angelidis and Degiannakis (2007) covers stock exchanges, commodities, and 
exchange rates. In their research, VaR models are estimated with ARCH volatility 
specifications that the performance of different distributions for VaR would be compared after 
the estimation. Moreover, they propose back-testing procedure to forecast with different 
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model and to select optimal model for each financial market. The most interesting finding of 
their study is that there exist a small amount of models which could generate the VaR 
accurately for both long and short periods. However, the flexible models do not equal to 
accuracy. It depends on the assumptions of distribution and volatility specification. Their 
study provides a comprehensive presentation of the measurement and applications of VaR 
(Angelidis and Degiannakis, 2007). Also, Hoppe (1998) has studied stock, bond, and 
exchange markets by using VaR models and found that variance-based statistical methods 
seems to interact among trailing sample length and holding period. The study suggests that a 
short length of sample size could reflect changes better than a larger sample size (Hoppe, 
1998), which provides more accurate VaR values, since sample with long period might lower 
the VaR values (Frey and Michaud, 1997). 
Many studies hold the same assumption for applying VaR that asset returns follow normal 
distribution, which is simplifying the computation of VaR considerably. However, there are 
sufficient empirical evidences showing the incoherent results with this hypothesis. Moreover, 
some data even reflect fat tails in distribution, which violates the hypothesis of normal 
distribution (Jorion, 2006). According to normally distributed assumption, it could not predict 
extreme events accurately if the events are more possible to occur in practice. Therefore, 
inconsistent measures of the risks in practice are totally inappropriate. 
Thus, to choose appropriate distribution and volatility specification is very important for 
using VaR to measure extreme market risk. When appropriate models are determined, VaR in 
one market could help to forecast the current or future risk in another market. 
2.3 E-GARCH Model 
There are many empirical studies for testing that whether has contagion effect during 
financial crises, but none of theoretical or empirical procedures are accepted by most 
researchers (Morales and Andreosso-OCallaghanb, 2012). VAR (Vector Auto-Regression) 
model is a potential alternative for testing contagion effect (Enders, 2008). Other 
methodologies include correlation analysis (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002) and probability 
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theory (Eichengreen et al., 1995). Certainly, some studies use GARCH or GARCH family 
model (T-GARCH, E-GARCH, I-GARCH and so on), such like Araujo and Garcia (2013), 
which proposes good results on testing contagion risk. 
Considering asymmetric and non-normal distribution, Billio and Pelizzon (2000) estimate the 
VaR of a switching volatility model to predict the distribution of returns. In this study, 
estimated VaR results are compared with variance-covariance (VCOV) approach and 
GARCH (1, 1) model. They prove that the calculated VaR with switching volatility model has 
a better performance than other methods. A compatible alternative distribution is skewed 
Student distribution. Some studies (Giot and Laurent, 2003) introduce skewed Student 
distribution into VaR models, which performed better than other alternatives. For skewed 
Student distribution, numerical optimization procedure is not required in estimating models, 
which shows superior property than other distributions. 
The methods calculated VaR values include Historical Simulation, variance-covariance 
(VCOV), Monte Carlo Simulation methods and so on. Vlaar (2000) tests these different 
approaches for determining an adequate VaR model for samples. The results (Vlaar, 2000) 
show that although GARCH-like variance specification is satisfied, the model would 
underestimate real variance and lead to too much exceeding errors. However, results could be 
improved when applying a combined model with variance-covariance (VCOV) and Monte 
Carlo Simulation method with normal distribution, which under GARCH specification. 
Angelidis et al. (2004) select five stock markets (S&P500, NIKKEI225, FTSE100, CAC40 
and DAX 30) to test the performance of an extensive family of ARCH models. In this study, 
daily VaR values of perfectly diversified portfolios are produced to test several distribution 
assumptions and sample sizes. The results indicate that different portfolios would require 
different models to forecast the VaR values accurately. Therefore, arranging a suitable model 
with appropriate distribution and sample size to forecast volatility is the first thing to be 
considered. Another piece of evidence is from the research of Angelidis and Degiannakis 
(2007). They suggest standard normal or GED for the most appropriate to calculate risk 
measures based on ARCH volatility models.  For most financial portfolios, asymmetric 
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volatility models would be better than symmetric ones. 
Billio and Pelizzon (2000) apply the volatility models to calculate VaR values, which are 
compared with the Variance-Covariance (VCOV) approach GARCH (1, 1) models. They also 
backtest the VaR values that it is obvious the regime beta model shows superiority than other 
methods. Many empirical studies support this statement that Frey and Michaud (1997) fit 
different GARCH models to find that the distributions corresponding to the models allowing 
for an asymmetric reaction of volatility to return shocks have considerably more mass in the 
lower tail than those of the symmetric models. This is reflected in prices and payoff 
distributions of derivatives. Other studies have proved that there exists risk spillover when 
suffering the financial crises. Giot and Laurent (2003) compare stock performances with the 
Risk Metrics, Normal APARCH, Student APARCH and Skewed Student APARCH models. 
The judgment is based on the estimated VaR results. At last, they address that an 
AR-APARCH model combined with a Skewed Student-t distribution performs very well. 
Dungey et al. (2010b) applied an identified structural GARCH model to simulate the dynamic 
financial crises due to the structural GARCH model could track the potential independent 
shifts to distinguish different transmissions in the capital markets. They draw the 
hypersensitivity of a domestic market out of financial crisis in terms of the news from foreign 
non-crisis markets, as well as the risk spillover coming from foreign domestic market within 
the crises. Apparent evidence of hypersensitivity has been identified, while the contagion 
phenomenon is also significant.  
In order to fix the shortcoming of GARCH model, Nelson (1991) has proposed a new model 
to fit the asymmetric information in the empirical data, which is the exponential general 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic model (E-GARCH). Yang and Doong (2004) apply 
this model under a multivariate way to evaluate asymmetries in the volatility transmission 
mechanism where the research targets are stock prices and exchange rates. They state that a 
direct effect of exchange rate changes reflects on future changes of stock prices. Aloui (2007) 
has employed the same model to find that movements of stock prices influence exchange rate 
dynamics. Although a range of different methodologies have been presented to analyse 
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contagion effects, E-GARCH model shows its superiority in analysis. There are several 
studies (Aloui, 2007) which use the E-GARCH model to capture the volatility of stock returns, 
especially for the asymmetry in stock market volatility. The E-GARCH model has several 
strengths than other models. To begin with, the E-GARCH model is free of nonnegative 
constraints on the parameters, which impose such restrictions for GARCH model. Also, the 
E-GARCH model can successfully capture the asymmetric volatility in the stock market. 
2.4 Backtesting 
It is not enough to just estimate the model for prediction, but also needs to examine the model 
validation whether the model gives the adequate prediction (Jorion, 2006).  Since the 
forecasts rely heavily on the estimates, small bias in the modelling process, such as 
misspecification, under-estimation of tail risks and so on, might cause large failure in the 
forecasts, so backtesting plays a critical role in the risk measurement. 
The early idea of backtesting follows the Bernoulli sequence, which is a basic frequency test 
(Jorion, 2009). In order to cover the shortcoming, Kupiec (1995) introduces Unconditional 
Coverage Test (Kupiec) for backtest the values of VaR. Moreover, Christoffersen (1998) has 
developed Unconditional Coverage Test (Kupiec) into Conditional Coverage Test 
(Christoffersen), which captures both the frequency and independence of exceptions 
(Campbell, 2005). 
Previous studies have shown the superiority of backtesting. Angelidis and Degiannakis (2007) 
compare different models for estimating VaR values. The models are examined by a 
two-stage backtesting procedure that only several models can predict the VaR values for both 
long and short trading positions accurately. Another study is from Araujo and Garcia (2013) 
that they select the best model for forecast different stock indices by backtesting. Indeed, the 
backtesting method does help to correct the model. They have found significant evidence of 
contagion effect among the European stock markets. 
In order to make adequate VaR values, both Unconditional Coverage Test (Kupiec) and 
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Conditional Coverage Test (Christoffersen) are introduced into this paper. 
2.5 Granger Causality 
The aim of this study is to detect the contagion risk within the financial crises. As a 
consequence, there should be an approach to examine the risk spillover of the extreme 
downside events among the stock markets. Therefore, Granger Causality Test is introduced 
into the studies of contagion effects to test the relationship between two time series (Hong, 
2001). Granger (1969) has developed the Granger Causality Test firstly into the analysis. It is 
a statistical hypothesis test to check whether the selected time series can be the reason to 
influence another time series (Granger, 1988). In other words, applying the historical data of 
one time series could contribute to forecast the parameters of another time series in the future. 
When this relationship is significant, the former time series can be viewed as the Granger 
Cause of the latter time series. 
Studying the volatility spillover between Deutschemark and Japanese yen, Hong (2001) states 
that changing in past Deutschemark volatility Granger causes a change in current Japanese 
yen volatility, but in contrast, no significant Granger Causality is revealed. Additionally, 
Alagidede et al. (2011) have proposed a study into the co-interaction between the stock 
markets and foreign exchange markets. They select the samples from Australia, Canada, 
Japan, Switzerland, and UK to carry on this study. Unlike the previous researches that find no 
evidence of long-run relationship between the stock markets and foreign exchange markets, 
Alagidede et al. (2011) have figured out the strong evidence of co-interaction from exchange 
rates to stock prices, whereas the Swiss sample reflects insignificant co-interaction. Hong et 
al. (2004) develop the concept of Granger Causality tests in analysing the spillover on the 
extreme negative shocks of the Chinese stock market. In addition, they discuss the effect 
between the Chinese stock market and other international stock markets as well. There are 
strong risk spillover within Chinese stocks, between stocks of Chinese mainland and other 
regions (such as Hong Kong and Taiwan), and Chinese stock market several South Asian 
countries, while insignificant spillover effect exists between share A indices and major 
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international stock markets. In contrast, share B index and particularly share H index reflect 
most extreme downside contagion effects from international stock markets. 
Following the approach of Granger Causality Test in risk (Hong et al., 2009), Fan et al. (2008) 
set GARCH models to calculate VaR values of international crude oil price returns. This 
study mainly applies Generalized Error Distribution. Note that back-testing approach of 
Kupiec (1995) is also included in evaluating the models. Similar to other previous researches, 
negative shocks always show spillover effect, while positive ones do not have the same 
performance. Historical information on risk could promote to predict future extreme events 
for correlated markets. Menezes (2013) has investigated the stock market co-integration 
effect by applying a framework of Granger Causality Test. As Granger Causality Test could 
capture the real relationship between the data groups, this study has taken this advantage to 
identify the contagion effect. Menezes (2013) selects the natural logarithm of relative stock 
market indices prices of the G7 group and finds strong evidence of globalization. 
More recently, Croux and Reusens (2013) have tried to apply Granger Causality analysis into 
domestic stock prices to forecast the domestic economic events in the future, which is under 
the domain of frequency. There is powerful evidence that slowly fluctuating components of 
the stock prices could be able to forecast the future GDP for G7 group, but this fact is weak 
for the rapidly fluctuating components. They suggest that slowly fluctuating components of 
the stock prices could be help to forecast the future macro economy. Although this study 
focuses on the quarterly data, it is still a successful application example for Granger Causality 
analysis. Pimentel and Choudhry (2014) take the example of Brazil from May 1986 to May 
2011 to examine the relationship between high inflation and interest rates in the stock markets. 
Granger Causality Test is also introduced into this study that high inflation and interest rates 
can be the Granger Cause for the other one, which means the significant evidence of 
co-interaction. 
Granger Causality in risk provides a good approach to test whether empirical samples reflect 
contagion risk. Understanding the existence of risk spillover would contribute to better 
forecast and monitoring of financial markets. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Data Selection 
The information needed to complete this work includes the stock market indices of selected 
countries during the financial crisis periods. In order to distinguish the differences between 
the crises, two financial crises are included in this study. Current Eurozone Crisis represents 
the extreme downside event which transmits from developed markets to emerging markets, 
whereas Asian Crisis in 1997 spread from emerging markets to developed markets. For Asian 
financial crisis which occurred in 1998, the sample period should between 1997 Jan 1st and 
1999 Dec 31st, whereas the time period is from 2009 June 1st to 2014 May 31st for current 
Eurozone Crisis started in 2010. Considering the lagging effect of financial crisis, the samples 
are selected as wide enough to cover the main period of financial crisis. 
Table 1 Stock Indices 
Type Time Period Country Stock Indices 
Developed 
Countries 
1997.1-1999.12
2009.6-2014.5
US Dow Jones Industrial Average 
Canada S&P/TSX Composite Index 
France CAC 40 
Germany DAX 
Italy FTSE MIB 
UK FTSE 100 
Japan Nikkei 225 
Emerging 
Markets 
1997.1-1999.12
2009.6-2014.5
Brazil Ibovespa 
China SSE Composite Index 
India BSE SENSEX 
Russia RTS Index 
Benchmark for 
Eurozone Crisis 
2009.6-2014.5
Spain IBEX 35 
Portugal PSI Geral 
Greece 
FTSE/ATHEX LARGE CA 
(Athex 20) 
Ireland ISEQ Overall Price 
Benchmark for 
Asian Crisis 
1997.1-1999.12
Indonesia JSX Composite 
South Korea KOSPI 
Thailand SET Index 
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Daily stock price indices data would be selected from main developed markets (G7 group: 
US, UK, France, Japanese, Germany, Canada, Italy), emerging markets (BRICs countries: 
Brazil, China, India, Russia) and benchmark countries (Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland 
for Eurozone crisis in 2010, while Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand for Asian financial 
crisis in 1997), as these groups can represent the corresponding markets. The selected stock 
indices of different countries are listed above (Table 1). The data is obtained with daily close 
prices of stock indices from DataStream. 
The study would mainly base on quantitative research method by analysing second hand data. 
The main objective of this research is to identify whether there exists a contagion risk across 
both emerging and developed stock markets after the shock took place and how it influences. 
E-GARCH (1, 1) VaR model with Generalized Error Distribution (GED) would be used to 
forecast the volatility results and compare the outcomes of volatility and Value-at-Risk 
evaluation for all the markets.  
Then, it should compare the results with two groups of samples (Eurozone and Asian Crisis). 
The VaR evaluation of stock price indices with volatility is necessary to test the correlation. 
E-GARCH (1, 1) VaR model with Generalized Error Distribution (GED) would be specified 
to investigate market interdependence and volatility effects across the countries. To evaluate 
the model validation, Unconditional Coverage Test (Kupiec) as well as Conditional Coverage 
Test (Christoffersen) would be applied to check if the selected model and distribution could 
fit all the samples. At last, the correlation relationship would be tested by Granger Causality 
Test to find whether there exists the contagion risk between stock markets by selected model. 
3.2 Returns 
Simply, this study uses ௧ܲ to represent one close price of stock index at time t. Then, log 
return is applied to evaluate the stock index returns ܴ௧ , which holds the definition as 
following (Meucci, 2010). 
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ܴ௧ ൌ ݈݊ ൬ ௧ܲ௧ܲିଵ൰ ൌ ݈݊ሺ ௧ܲሻ െ ݈݊ሺ ௧ܲିଵሻ 
The return period is set from time t-1 to time t and log function here is the natural logarithm. 
So we can explain time series ܴ௧ as following. ܴ௧ ൌ ሺܴ௧ȁܴ௧ିଵሻ ൅ ߝ௧ 
In this formula, the term of ሺܴ௧ȁܴ௧ିଵሻ indicates the conditional mean of ܴ௧, while ܴ௧ିଵ is 
the stock index returns at time t-1; and ߝ௧ defines as the shift of stock index close price 
return at time t. In addition, term ߪ௧is the square root of series variance with the positive 
value, which is referred as the following. 
ߪ௧ଶ ൌ ܸܽݎሺߝ௧ሻ 
3.3 GARCH Model 
After the basic definitions, the autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic model (ARCH) 
should be mentioned. Engle (1982) has firstly developed the ARCH approach to generate 
observed time series to build forecast model when the error term would have a variance at 
any point in the series. The assumption of special ARCH models is that the current error term 
can be presented by a function of previous time periods' error terms with actual sizes, where 
the variance is usually correlated to the previous error terms (Engle and Bollerslev, 1986). 
For ARCH model, the particular asset return would have a shift ߝ௧ , which is serially 
uncorrelated. Also, ߝ௧ is dependent and can be presented with simple quadratic function with 
the lag values of itself. Formally, an ARCH (q) model can be shown as following. 
ߝ௧ ൌ ߪ௧ כ ݖ௧ 
ߪ௧ଶ ൌ ܽ଴ ൅෍ܽ௜ כ ߝ௧ି௜ଶ௤௜ୀ଴  
In the formula of ARCH (q), ݖ௧ is often referred as a series of random variables which 
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follows the N (0, 1) distribution. The formula of ARCH (q) needs to satisfy the conditions 
that ܽ଴ > 0 and ܽ௜  0 (where i > 0 until q). 
However, empirical studies indicate that a high value of p must be used to model the suitable 
conditional variance (Angelidis et al., 2004). If the lag of ARCH models is too large, ARCH 
model would need many parameters to describe the volatility of the return. Bollerslev (1986) 
has developed the ARCH theory of Engle (1982), which is known as the GARCH (p, q) 
model. For the theory of Bollerslev (1986), the Generalized ARCH model, known as GARCH 
(p, q) model, is shown as following. 
ߪ௧ଶ ൌ ܽ଴ ൅෍ܽ௜ כ ߝ௧ି௜ଶ௤௜ୀ଴ ൅෍ ௝ܾ כ ߪ௧ି௝ଶ௣௝ୀ଴  
The formula of GARCH (p, q) needs to satisfy the conditions that ܽ଴ > 0 and ܽ௜  0 (where 
i > 0 until q), while ܾ଴ > 0 and ௝ܾ  0 (where j > 0 until p). 
Compared with ARCH (q) model, the GARCH (p, q) model can capture the thick tailed 
returns and volatility clustering of financial time series (Angelidis et al., 2004). Drawback 
also plays a role in the GARCH (p, q) model that this model needs a lot of samples or 
observations to estimate the parameters. Additionally, GARCH (p, q) model proposes a 
shortcoming that odds with the empirical behaviour could produce a leverage eơect in the 
stock market prices, as the variance hinges on magnitude and but not on the sign of ߝ௧. Some 
studies illustrate that changes in returns could be inversely correlated with the changes in the 
stock returns volatility (Black, 1976). In other words, volatility would climb when negative 
events come (İt < 0), whereas volatility would drop if there is good news (İt > 0). More 
recently, Brooks and Persand (2003) address that GARCH (p, q) model might miss the 
asymmetric information when generates the VaR values. Hence, inadequate results may lead 
to unreasonable predictions. 
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3.4 E-GARCH Model 
Considering the unreasonable predictions, Nelson (1991) has proposed a new model to fit the 
asymmetric information in the empirical data, which is the exponential general autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedastic model (E-GARCH). Generally, an E-GARCH (p, q) can be 
presented as following. 
ሺߪ௧ଶሻ ൌ ܽ଴ ൅෍൬ܽ௜ ฬߝ௧ି௜ߪ௧ି௜ฬ ൅ ߛ௜ ߝ௧ି௜ߪ௧ି௜൰୯୧ୀ଴ ൅෍ ௝ܾ୮୨ୀ଴ ሺߪ௧ି௝ଶ ሻ 
Compared with the standard GARCH (p, q) model, E-GARCH (p, q) model does not have any 
limitation on the estimating the parameters, due to the logarithmic form enables the prediction 
to be non-negative values, as the ߛ௜ term could fit the asymmetric information (Brandt and 
Jones, 2006). Actually, E-GARCH (p, q) model relaxes the restriction on model coefficients 
by using logged conditional variance that can cover the drop or rise in the samples. Both 
positive and negative lagged values of positive and negative lagged values can be reflected 
asymmetrically in E-GARCH (p, q) model, which makes the leverage effect become 
significant. 
3.5 Value-at-Risk 
As mentioned before, Value-at-Risk (VaR), which defines as p% of loss, is a widely used 
measurement in risk management (Beder, 1995). The risk measure of VaR gives probabilities 
with specific loss amount, which is simple to understand and relatively easy to backtesting. 
Given a confidence levelȽ א (0, 1), the smallest value l defines theȽ confidence level of 
VaR values, and the probability that the loss L exceeds l would be at the opposite position, 
which is ሺ	? െ Ƚሻ confidence level. For this aspect, the L represents the loss of a particular 
asset. Thus, the VaR value defined theȽ confidence level could be shown as following 
(Artzner et al., 1999). 
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ఈሺܮሻ ൌ ݂݅݊ሼ݈ א ܴǣ ܲሺܮ ൐ ݈ሻ ൑ 	 ? െ ߙሽ ൌ ݂݅݊ሼ݈ א ܴǣ ܨ௅ሺ݈ሻ ൒ ߙሽ 
Some studies address that VaR reflects each point of the tails estimated in empirical data 
(Angelidis and Degiannakis, 2007). Dowd (2005) emphasizes that VaR makes a methods to 
critically consider the risk exposure by an imposition on structure. Additionally, VaR 
measures risk factors in a consistent way. It enables that the risk is assessed as a whole of 
portfolio risk (Hull, 2012). In other words, it has taken account of risk interaction with each 
other at the firm wide level. Hence, the process of estimating VaR values should be very 
important to measure the exposure adequately. 
3.6 Distribution 
When applying parametric approach, the logic here is to estimate risk by fitting probability 
curves to the data and then inferring the risk measure from the fitted curve (Hull, 2012). 
Empirical return processes usually have the features like heavy tails, excess kurtosis and 
skews as well. Parametric approach therefore tests whether there exists distribution could 
accommodate the features. 
When modelling the data statistically, the difference between the observed values and the 
expected values are regarded as errors. In the early studies, researchers assume the errors are 
random variable which is under the standard normal distribution with mean zero and standard 
deviation one. However, many empirical studies have identified that standard normal 
distribution cannot satisfy the empirical data appropriately. As a result, Generalized Error 
Distribution (GED) is developed to cover the requirement. Nelson (1991) has applied 
Generalized Error Distribution (GED) into linear regression models to analyse the time series 
with heavy tails. As for the definition, Generalized Error Distribution (GED) is symmetric 
distribution member of the exponential family. Three parameters define this distribution that Ɋ is the location of this distribution, and ɐ is the standard deviation of the distribution and Ɉ determines the skewness of this distribution. The formula of 	?
ሺߤǡ ߪଶǡ Ɉሻ can be shown, 
where x is the domain of probability density function. Thus, the probability distribution 
function F(x) can be presented as following (Nelson, 1991). 
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	ሺݔȁߤǡ ߪǡ Ɉሻ ൌ ݁ିଵଶቚ௫ିఓఙ ቚభಒ	?சାଵߪ߁ሺɈ ൅ 	 ?ሻ ݀ݔ 
The reason why applies the Generalized Error Distribution (GED) into this study is that 
Generalized Error Distribution (GED) can fit the fat and thin tails smoothly, as the samples 
included during the crisis periods may have strong evidence of skewness and kurtosis. Using 
standard Normal Distribution may lead to unreasonable results. Generalized Error 
Distribution (GED) allows us fit the samples with E-GARCH (1, 1) VaR model accurately. 
3.7 Backtesting 
When estimating VaR model, model validation should be checked to identify whether the 
model could produce reasonable forecasts (Dowd, 2005). Since the forecasts rely heavily on 
the estimates, small bias in the modelling process might cause large failure in the forecasts, so 
backtesting plays a critical role in the risk measurement. It could give indication of possible 
problems and help to track the mistakes, such as misspecification, under-estimation of tail 
risks and so on. Basic idea for backtesting is to compare the VaR forecasts with the associated 
portfolio returns (Jorion, 2009). Backtesting techniques allow us to verify the accuracy of 
VaR models. If the actual returns exceed the VaR forecasts, it means that the violation does 
occur and the VaR model should be re-estimated by changing components. In this paper, both 
Unconditional Coverage Test (Kupiec) and Conditional Coverage Test (Christoffersen) 
generate the results, and null hypotheses are the same that the exceedances are correct, while 
the alternative ones are the model is not appropriate. 
When taking backtesting, it needs to count the VaR violations first. VaR violation refers to the 
number of time series exceeding the forecast VaR values. If the VaR model is good, the 
violation number should equal or under the excepted number, or in other words, falls in the 
range of permitting expected exceeding values. Thus, the formula of violation number can be 
shown as following. 
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ܫ௧ାଵ ൌ ൜	?ǡ ݂݅ ௧ܴାଵ ൒ ܸܴܽ௧ାଵ	?ǡ ݂݅ ௧ܴାଵ ൏ ܸܴܽ௧ାଵ 
Definitely, the violation number (N) is the total number of series ܫ௧ାଵ, which generates the 
total failure forecasts of VaR values. The most common way of backtesting is to count the 
violations of VaR values but this method proposes the problem that whether we observe the 
exact number of violations. Backtesting in the early time is a basic frequency test that checks 
whether the forecast exceptions of VaR frequency have coherent results with the general 
frequency of exceptions under the particular confidence level. The null hypothesis is the 
model exceeds are correct, while the alternative ones are the model is not appropriate. The 
number of tail losses x is binomial, while the n is the number of observations and ሺ	 ? െ ݌ሻ is 
the selected confidence interval. So the probability of Bernoulli sequence is as following 
(Jorion, 2009). 
ሺݔ ൌ ݇ȁ݊ǡ ݌ሻ ൌ ቀ݊݇ቁ ݌௞ሺ	 ? െ ݌ሻ௡ି௞ 
If the estimated probability is above the desired level (95% confidence level, so 5% for 
desired value), the VaR model cannot reject the null hypothesis of correct exceeds. Then, the 
model is good. If the estimated probability is below the desired level, there could be some 
problems in the model. The basic frequency test is easy to implement that it does not require 
too much information, but it is still under criticism as the basic frequency test throws 
information away and might be not reasonable with small sample sizes. More exactly, the 
basic frequency test only reflects the frequency of exceptions but has not given any idea on 
the time dynamics of the exceptions (Dowd, 2005). For example, the accuracy of this formula 
is doubtable that there is a trade-off between Type 1 error (the possibility of rejecting a 
correct model) and Type 2 error (the possibility of accepting a wrong model). Jorion (2009) 
suggests that these two types of error should minimize in the statistical test. 
Therefore, Kupiec (1995) has developed Unconditional Coverage Test (Kupiec) for backtest 
the values of VaR. For Unconditional Coverage Test (Kupiec), the null hypothesis is that 
failure rate f would be equal to the excepted level p, where x is the number of tail losses, n is 
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the number of observations and ሺ	 ? െ ݌ሻ is the selected confidence interval. 
 ൌ ݊ݔ ൌ ݌ 
That whether the exceeds are correct can be examined by using the likelihood ratio as 
following, where x is the number of tail losses that follows the binomial distribution, n is the 
number of observations and ሺ	 ? െ ݌ሻ is the selected confidence interval (Jorion, 2009). 
ܮܴ௎஼ ൌ െ	 ?݈ሾ݊ሺ	 ? െ ݌ሻ௡ି௫݌௫ሿ ൅ 	 ?݈ ቈ݊൬	 ? െ ݔ݊ ൰௡ି௫ ቀ݊ݔቁ௫቉ 
If the estimated likelihood is below the critical value (95% confidence level, so 5% for 
desired value), the VaR model cannot reject the null hypothesis of correct exceeds. Then, the 
model is good. However, if the estimated likelihood is larger than the corresponding critical 
value, there could be some problems in the model. However, the Unconditional Coverage 
Test (Kupiec) has the shortcoming that the same samples may have different variances for 
sub-series (Dowd, 2005). As a result, the VaR model ignores important information that leads 
to inconsistent results. Nonetheless, it is still a good approach for backtesting.  
In order to avoid the bias, Conditional Coverage Test (Christoffersen) is introduced into this 
study as well. Christoffersen (1998) proposed another statistic specifying that the deviations 
must be serially independent. Conditional Coverage Test (Christoffersen) captures both the 
frequency and independence of exceptions (Jorion, 2009), where the null hypothesis of this 
test is that the exceeding is correct and independent. The formula of Conditional Coverage 
Test (Christoffersen) is shown as following, where x is the number of tail losses that follows 
the binomial distribution, the n is the number of observations and p is the selected confidence 
interval (Christoffersen and Pelletier, 2004). The standard deviation indicates the range 
between 0 (no violation occurs) and 1 (violation occurs). Then, ௜ܶ௝ is the number of days 
when condition j occurred with the assumption that condition i occurred on the previous day. 
In addition, ߨ௜ refers to the probability of detecting an exception condition i at the previous 
day. Thus, the formula is as following (Christoffersen, 2009). 
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ܮܴ௜௡ௗ ൌ െ	 ?݈ሾ݊ሺ	 ? െ ߨሻ బ்బା భ்బ כ ߨ బ்భା భ்భሿ ൅ 	 ?݈ሾ݊ሺ	 ? െ ߨ଴ሻ బ்బ כ ߨ଴ బ்భ כ ሺ	 ? െ ߨଵሻ భ்బ כ ߨଵ భ்భሿ 
The second half part indicates the maximized likelihood for the observed data, while the first 
half part of this formula is the maximized likelihood, where the null hypothesis is that 
violations are independent with the days as following. 
Ɏ ൌ ߨ଴ ൌ ߨଵ ൌ ଴ܶଵ ൅ ଵܶଵܶ  
Thus, the statistic for Conditional Coverage Test (Christoffersen) is shown as following 
(Christoffersen, 2009). 
ܮܴ஼஼ ൌ ܮܴ௎஼ ൅ ܮܴ௜௡ௗ 
If the estimated statistic is below the critical value at selected confidence interval (95% 
confidence level), the VaR model cannot reject the null hypothesis of correct exceeds and 
independence. Thus, the model can pass Conditional Coverage Test (Christoffersen). 
However, if the estimated statistic is above the critical value, there could be some problems in 
the model.  
Conditional Coverage Test (Christoffersen) can identify the model with too many clustered 
violations and capture the feature of current risk. In general, it would be reasonable to base on 
both Unconditional Coverage Test (Kupiec) and Conditional Coverage Test (Christoffersen) 
to analyse the problem. 
3.8 Granger Causality Test 
Perhaps, how to detect the contagion risk within the financial crises is the most important 
topic in this study. Granger Causality Test in risk is applied into this paper to evaluate the 
extreme downside events among the stock markets. 
As for the definition, Granger Causality Test is referred as a statistical hypothesis test to 
examine whether the selected time series can be the reason to influence another time series 
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(Engle and Granger, 1987). Granger (2004) emphasizes that applying the historical data of 
one time series could contribute to forecast the parameters of another time series in the future. 
When this relationship is significant, the former time series can be viewed as the Granger 
Cause of the latter time series. Although the E-GARCH (1, 1) model with Generalized Error 
Distribution (GED) could estimate parameters and give prediction on VaR values, it still lacks 
the ability to judge the relationship or contagion effect between different financial markets. 
Considering the original concept of Granger Causality Test, it is an excellent approach to 
examine the risk spillover in the financial crisis. The theoretical idea in this study is to 
compare one stock index with another one to check whether the market forecast can be 
influenced by another one (Granger, 1988). If this kind of mechanism is significant at the 
selected confidence interval, the latter time series can be concluded as the Granger Cause for 
the former one. In other words, one market probably will suffer the risk spillover when the 
correlated markets have extreme negative events. This application could make contribution to 
effective financial risk management, as well as investment diversification. 
If ݕ௧ and ݔ௧ are two stationary time series, the null hypothesis that ݔ௧ is not the Granger 
Cause of ݕ௧ with appropriate lag value m can be tested as following. ݕ௧ ൌ ܽ଴ ൅ ܽଵݕ௧ିଵ ൅ ܽଶݕ௧ିଶ ൅ڮ൅ ܽ௠ݕ௧ି௠ ൅ ߝ௧ ݕ௧ ൌ ܽ଴ ൅ ܽଵݕ௧ିଵ ൅ ܽଶݕ௧ିଶ ൅ڮ൅ ܽ௠ݕ௧ି௠ ൅ ܾ௣ݕ௧ି௣ ൅ڮ൅ ܾ௤ݕ௧ି௤ ൅ ߝ௧ 
Above presentation includes the shortest p and longest q lag values for the variable ݔ௧, while ߝ௧ is the residuals of the formula. If the variable x stays in the regression of the univariate 
auto-regression of variable ݕ௧, the null hypothesis would not be rejected and variable ݔ௧ can 
be concluded as the Granger Cause of variable ݕ௧ (Hiemstra and Jones, 1994). 
The assumption here is that the all the testing time series should be stationary, while 
non-stationary could be used by applying the first (or higher) differences. Note that the 
Granger Cause Test has a lagged value to estimate the results, which would indicate different 
conclusion with inconsistent lag values (Granger, 1969). Information criterion, such as 
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Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Information Criterion (BIC), is responsible 
to select the best lag value (Granger, 2004). Many empirical studies may have the results that 
neither time series can be the Granger Cause for the other one, while another condition is that 
each time series can be the Granger Cause for the other. It is not limited by one condition. 
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4. DATA AND RESULTS 
4.1 Eurozone Crisis 
4.1.1 Date Requirement (Eurozone Crisis) 
In order to explore the contagion risk between different financial markets, it is important to 
estimate E-GARCH model for each sample first, after which could evaluate the risk spillover. 
According to different developing levels of financial markets, three types of stock indices are 
presented, what are developed markets (G7 groups: US Dow Jones Industrial Average, 
Canada S&P/TSX Composite Index, France CAC 40, Germany DAX, Italy FTSE MIB, UK 
FTSE 100 and Japan Nikkei 225); emerging markets (the four countries of BRICs: Brazil 
Ibovespa, India BSE SENSEX, China SSE Composite Index and Russia RTS Index); and 
benchmark markets (the countries suffer the most loss in the Eurozone Crisis: Spain IBEX 35, 
Portugal PSI Geral, Greece FTSE/ATHEX LARGE CA and Ireland ISEQ Overall Price). The 
daily stock close prices are used to perform log returns. And the period concerned is from 
June 1st 2009 to May 31st 2014 obtained from DataStream that covers the Eurozone Crisis.  
All the plotting of stock indices in the Eurozone Crisis are shown in the Appendix (from 
Figure 1 to Figure 15), while the plotting of returns are shown in the Appendix as well (from 
Figure 16 to Figure 30). 
4.1.2 Data Description (Eurozone Crisis) 
To begin with, whether the samples are stationary should be checked by Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test (ADF). If the selected stock indices can satisfy the assumptions, they can 
have further analysis. The null hypothesis: the series is non-stationary, while the alternative 
hypothesis: the series is stationary. The significant level applied here is 95% level. 
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Table 2 Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Eurozone Crisis) 
           Test 
Sample 
Unit Root (ADF test) 
Statistics p-value Critical Values 
United Kingdom -19.24920  0.00000  1% level -3.43000  
United States -17.69890  0.00000  5% level -2.86000  
Canada -14.06840  0.00000  10% level -2.57000  
France -19.76270  0.00000  
 
Germany -21.66660  0.00000  
Italy -19.49160  0.00000  
Japan -18.55760  0.00000  
Brazil -24.72360  0.00000  
China -24.54500  0.00000  
India -20.48300  0.00000  
Russia -23.68740  0.00000  
Spain -20.32320  0.00000  
Portugal -19.61950  0.00000  
Greece -26.46120  0.00000  
Ireland -27.07910  0.00000  
In the Table 2, it is clear that all the stock indices reject the null hypothesis of non-stationary 
at any significant level. Thus, the samples with log returns form can be used to further study. 
As we can see, Table 3 shows the basic features of daily log returns of the 15 indices during 
Eurozone Crisis. It is obvious that each stock index holds strong skewness and kurtosis, 
which means that most indices appear to have fat tails and left skewness. From the 
descriptive statistics, it indicates that Normal Distribution might not be suitable for estimating 
E-GARCH model. 
In addition, Table 4 presents the Jarque-Bera (JB) test and Ljung-Box Q-statistic for selected 
stock indices. At any significant level of Jarque-Bera (JB) test, the null hypothesis of Normal 
Distribution is rejected in all cases, which proves the inference of strong skewness and 
kurtosis. Note that the Ljung-Box Q-statistic, which is tested for the squared series with order 
7, reflects a high serial correlation in the variance. The reason to choose order 7 is that, Tsay 
(2005) suggests that simulation studies could apply the degrees of freedom as ln(M), where 
M is the number of observations. This would perform better in the simulations. 
30

Table 3 Description of Samples (Eurozone Crisis) 
          Statistic 
Sample 
Description 
Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
United Kingdom 0.00032  0.01010  -0.19234  2.08341  
United States 0.00057  0.01048  -0.47977  3.97230  
Canada 0.00025  0.00884  -0.43961  2.34335  
France 0.00023  0.01376  -0.01113  3.21198  
Germany 0.00051  0.01297  -0.21097  2.29189  
Italy 0.00004  0.01656  -0.08885  2.45791  
Japan 0.00034  0.01403  -0.73086  4.53779  
Brazil -0.00005  0.01388  -0.19664  1.82796  
China -0.00023  0.01281  -0.46905  2.57747  
India 0.00040  0.01142  -0.07856  1.24071  
Russia 0.00008  0.01805  -0.50676  3.59872  
Spain 0.00009  0.01581  0.30096  5.24294  
Portugal 0.00014  0.01176  0.14593  5.74335  
Greece -0.00089  0.02541  0.28447  2.52730  
Ireland 0.00043  0.01287  -0.29746  2.60791  
 
Table 4 Description of Samples (Eurozone Crisis) 
         Statistic 
Sample 
Description 
JB Statistics JB p-value LB Q(7) LB p-value 
United Kingdom 244.92110  0.00000  244.93490  0.00000  
United States 880.09440  0.00000  463.19450  0.00000  
Canada 334.98200  0.00000  263.72630  0.00000  
France 554.45180  0.00000  179.55300  0.00000  
Germany 291.91740  0.00000  351.43420  0.00000  
Italy 324.86800  0.00000  169.05020  0.00000  
Japan 1172.69500  0.00000  140.57800  0.00000  
Brazil 181.98100  0.00000  114.55720  0.00000  
China 391.84810  0.00000  88.13410  0.00000  
India 81.56210  0.00000  131.22970  0.00000  
Russia 734.44570  0.00000  64.66660  0.00000  
Spain 1490.31500  0.00000  169.38010  0.00000  
Portugal 1740.50300  0.00000  127.05880  0.00000  
Greece 367.00280  0.00000  118.73010  0.00000  
Ireland 384.09600  0.00000  207.06310  0.00000  
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4.1.3 Estimation of E-GARCH VaR Models (Eurozone Crisis) 
After describing the main features of selected stock indices, especially the volatility 
clustering, E-GARCH (1, 1) Model is adopted to fit in all cases. During the estimating 
process, a confidence level of 95% is adopted for all the p-values. In Table 4 and Table 5, 
parameter values for estimating E-GARCH models have shown in the first row of each stock 
index, while the second row presents the p-values for different parameters. 
According to the strong skewness and kurtosis, Generalized Error Distribution (GED) 
generates the parameters. Concretely, a confidence of 95% is adopted to evaluate the 
performance of assumption. As the results in Table 5 and Table 6, the model of E-GARCH (1, 
1) under the Generalized Error Distribution (GED) is valid for most series. However, several 
indices have not passed the 95% confidence level with some parameters, such like Italy, 
China, Brazil and India, which might produce unstandardized residuals. This brings doubts on 
the assumptions of choosing distribution and model. We will discuss it in Backtesting Section 
later. 
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Table 5 E-GARCH Model Parameters 1-2 (Eurozone Crisis) 
Estimate 
Sample 
E-GARCH Model Parameters 
Mean AR Term MA Term Constant 
United Kingdom 
0.00035  0.97254  -0.97853  -0.41067  
0.02110  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  
United States 
0.00065  -0.71156  0.69078  -0.44948  
0.00024  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  
Canada 
0.00033  -0.15949  0.20204  -0.19871  
0.04210  0.00106  0.00003  0.00000  
France 
0.00022  -0.16282  0.13109  -0.33900  
0.33513  0.00032  0.00462  0.00000  
Germany 
0.00062  -0.97585  0.99038  -0.26940  
0.01330  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  
Italy 
0.00026  -0.26484  0.25936  -0.25666  
0.49598  0.02887  0.03255  0.00000  
Japan 
0.00046  -0.29217  0.24934  -0.74400  
0.02611  0.00000  0.00000  0.52312  
Brazil 
-0.00031  0.90707  -0.89914  -0.40055  
0.46073  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  
China 
0.00002  0.08415  -0.09065  -0.15353  
0.97407  0.02534  0.00000  0.00000  
India 
0.00020  0.27342  -0.21378  -0.27276  
0.49492  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  
Russia 
0.00029  0.10165  -0.03852  -0.14324  
0.50180  0.08501  0.50512  0.00000  
Spain 
-0.00004  -0.00110  0.06201  -0.20395  
0.90416  0.99128  0.53423  0.00000  
Portugal 
0.00034  0.08463  -0.01515  -0.46632  
0.08850  0.17578  0.83812  0.00000  
Greece 
-0.00052  -0.71518  0.75902  -0.23954  
0.04055  0.00000  0.00000  0.00200  
Ireland 
0.00063  0.75994  -0.80658  -0.25407  
0.00737  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  
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Table 6 E-GARCH Model Parameters 2-2 (Eurozone Crisis) 
Estimate 
Sample 
E-GARCH Model Parameters 
ARCH 
Term 
GARCH 
Term 
Asymmetry 
Term 
Shape Log-Likelihood 
United 
Kingdom 
-0.14519  0.95657 0.15197  1.44263  
4279.57200  
0.00000  0.00000 0.00000  0.00000  
United States 
-0.21629  0.95306 0.13774  1.33271  
4166.82500  
0.00000  0.00000 0.00000  0.00000  
Canada 
-0.14198  0.98008 0.09745  1.48372  
4395.77900  
0.00000  0.00000 0.00000  0.00000  
France 
-0.20367  0.96208 0.10536  1.46933  
3850.72500  
0.00000  0.00000 0.00000  0.00000  
Germany 
-0.15915  0.97039 0.12078  1.37980  
3932.69300  
0.00000  0.00000 0.00000  0.00000  
Italy 
-0.12410  0.96979 0.09038  1.58288  
3548.24600  
0.00000  0.00000 0.00000  0.00000  
Japan 
-0.10048  0.91408 0.17906  1.53389  
3586.68600  
0.22256  0.00000 0.00000  0.00000  
Brazil 
-0.10417  0.95363 0.10513  1.67074  
3600.76800  
0.00000  0.00000 0.00003  0.00000  
China 
-0.01147  0.98258 0.07677  1.09903  
3740.72000  
0.39464  0.00000 0.00000  0.00000  
India 
-0.11232  0.96999 0.10825  1.55463  
3871.49400  
0.00000  0.00000 0.00000  0.00000  
Russia 
-0.06894  0.98276 0.09769  1.29256  
3394.57300  
0.00000  0.00000 0.00000  0.00000  
Spain 
-0.13783  0.97627 0.09601  1.58501  
3642.99400  
0.00000  0.00000 0.00000  0.00000  
Portugal 
-0.11082  0.94888 0.12872  1.56283  
3927.38700  
0.00000  0.00000 0.00000  0.00000  
Greece 
-0.03432  0.96781 0.13217  1.28567  
3030.33200  
0.04597  0.00000 0.07400  0.00000  
Ireland 
-0.05185  0.97159 0.16963  1.57821  
3882.36300  
0.00305  0.00000 0.00000  0.00000  
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After focus on the parameters, it is essential to check whether the model has collected all the 
necessary information. The E-GARCH model generates Ljung-Box Q-statistics for both 
Standardized Residuals and Standardized Squared Residuals with 1, 5 and 9 lags. As the 
Table 7 shows, all Standardized Residuals of the stock indices cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of randomness at a significant level of 95%, except for Ireland ISEQ Overall Price 
stock index. In other words, most Standardized Residuals of the stock indices have 
independent distribution, where there is no autocorrelations from the samples. Thus, any 
observed correlations could be resulted from randomness of the sampling process (Ljung and 
Box, 1978). Although Ireland ISEQ Overall Price stock index is the only one to reject the null 
hypothesis and shows distributed dependently, E-GARCH (1, 1) model with Generalized 
Error Distribution (GED) can fit most samples. This proves that the choice of model is 
appropriate. Table 8 also testifies this inference that the almost all the Standardized Squared 
Residuals of selected indices after modelling cannot reject the null hypothesis of independent 
distribution with 1, 5 and 9 lags, while only United States Dow Jones Industrial Average 
reveals autocorrelation from the sample. Finally, Weighted ARCH Lagrange Multiplier Test 
(Table 9) provides the evidence as well that only Italian stock index FTSE MIB with 3 lags 
and Spain IBEX 35 with 5 and 7 lags reject the null hypothesis of no ARCH effect, while all 
the others cannot reject the null hypothesis. It means that there is no ARCH effect in the 
residuals after modelling. More specifically, the residuals left are white noise, which means 
all valuable information has been collected. Nonetheless, considering all these evidences 
given by these tests, E-GARCH (1, 1) model with Generalized Error Distribution (GED) can 
fit selected stock indices accurately and give reasonable forecasts. 
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Table 7 E-GARCH Model Tests 1-3 (Eurozone Crisis) 
              Test 
Sample 
E-GARCH Model Tests 
LB Test on Standardized Residuals 
lag=1 lag=5 lag=9 
United Kingdom 
0.12470  0.72850  1.85850  
0.72400  1.00000  0.98970  
United States 
0.18650  2.71900  4.38410  
0.66580  0.65100  0.59920  
Canada 
0.01514  3.56428  6.27691  
0.90210  0.18110  0.21400  
France 
0.06210  2.98820  4.51390  
0.80320  0.47940  0.56790  
Germany 
0.00442  2.43582  3.53839  
0.94700  0.81150  0.79340  
Italy 
0.01639  0.83072  1.46840  
0.89810  1.00000  0.99740  
Japan 
0.34790  1.70750  2.66750  
0.55530  0.99110  0.93450  
Brazil 
0.00034  0.36963  1.49743  
0.98530  1.00000  0.99710  
China 
0.20990  1.53370  4.49670  
0.64690  0.99740  0.57210  
India 
0.00017  0.58941  1.39625  
0.98960  1.00000  0.99810  
Russia 
0.04684  0.93448  2.75523  
0.82870  1.00000  0.92420  
Spain 
0.07485  2.01268  3.41949  
0.78440  0.95570  0.81740  
Portugal 
0.23890  1.57830  3.23290  
0.62500  0.99630  0.85220  
Greece 
0.59390  1.12600  1.55210  
0.44090  1.00000  0.99640  
Ireland 
5.36700  7.50600  8.76900  
0.02053  0.00000  0.02947  
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Table 8 E-GARCH Model Tests 2-3 (Eurozone Crisis) 
           Test 
Sample 
E-GARCH Model Tests 
LB Test on Standardized Squared Residuals 
lag=1 lag=5 lag=9 
United Kingdom 
4.63100  5.10000  5.48200  
0.03140  0.14530  0.36220  
United States 
10.33000  12.41000  15.99000  
0.00131  0.00217  0.00205  
Canada 
8.13700  10.55300  13.97600  
0.00434  0.00664  0.00630  
France 
1.82800  2.64900  3.13700  
0.17630  0.47500  0.73620  
Germany 
3.60200  4.03600  4.31900  
0.05770  0.24960  0.53570  
Italy 
1.70600  5.57000  7.02400  
0.19150  0.11330  0.19720  
Japan 
0.58200  1.42100  3.36000  
0.44550  0.75940  0.69840  
Brazil 
0.29320  2.40030  3.07500  
0.58820  0.52730  0.74650  
China 
1.09300  3.41100  6.86000  
0.29570  0.33700  0.21120  
India 
0.19680  1.66890  2.88790  
0.65740  0.69840  0.77730  
Russia 
0.18080  0.54930  1.48830  
0.67060  0.94980  0.95650  
Spain 
1.77400  6.61600  9.84100  
0.18294  0.06421  0.05424  
Portugal 
5.38600  5.54800  6.07900  
0.02030  0.11470  0.28920  
Greece 
0.17700  2.55600  5.04200  
0.67390  0.49410  0.42320  
Ireland 
0.94740  6.43980  8.94160  
0.33039  0.07075  0.08356  
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Table 9 E-GARCH Model Tests 3-3 (Eurozone Crisis) 
           Test 
Sample 
E-GARCH Model Tests 
Weighted ARCH LM Tests 
lag=1 lag=5 lag=9 
United Kingdom 
0.01710  0.09792  0.13667  
0.89600  0.98720  0.99870  
United States 
0.70440  1.62550  5.34750  
0.40130  0.56000  0.19170  
Canada 
1.30900  4.57500  6.69400  
0.25260  0.12870  0.10100  
France 
0.37790  0.69650  0.93190  
0.53870  0.82450  0.92440  
Germany 
0.41360  0.62520  0.78760  
0.52020  0.84610  0.94550  
Italy 
4.72100  5.26600  5.66100  
0.02980  0.08915  0.16570  
Japan 
0.00048  2.06180  2.62167  
0.98250  0.45770  0.58760  
Brazil 
0.16560  0.18270  0.61110  
0.68400  0.96950  0.96730  
China 
0.29680  2.18990  5.41550  
0.58590  0.43080  0.18580  
India 
0.88970  1.92400  2.61320  
0.34560  0.48830  0.58940  
Russia 
0.03844  0.67894  0.79281  
0.84460  0.82990  0.94480  
Spain 
0.00860  7.97888  8.70460  
0.92613  0.02031  0.03648  
Portugal 
0.12130  0.14220  0.76650  
0.72760  0.97850  0.94830  
Greece 
2.79200  3.62900  5.73000  
0.09475  0.21068  0.16046  
Ireland 
0.09516  0.71850  2.62337  
0.75770  0.81780  0.58730  
4.1.4 Backtesting (Eurozone Crisis) 
As a critical part of risk measurement, backtesting gives indication of possible problems on 
the model validation. It relies heavily on the estimates. To avoid the mistakes, both 
Unconditional Coverage Test (Kupiec) and Conditional Coverage Test (Christoffersen) 
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generate the results, and null hypotheses are the same that the exceedances are correct, while 
the alternative ones are the model is not suitable. The 95% significance level VaR values are 
estimate under the previous E-GARCH (1, 1) model with Generalized Error Distribution 
(GED). Then, estimated VaR values would compare with actual stock indices to track the 
violations. At last, Unconditional Coverage Test (Kupiec) and Conditional Coverage Test 
(Christoffersen) would put the model validation into evaluation. Note that the confidence 
level of both tests is at 95% level. 
Based on the Table 10, actual exceedances are closed to expected exceedances. Though actual 
exceedances of some stock indices are more than expected exceedances, backtesting can 
gives indication on whether the exceedances are accepted.  
Table 10 E-GARCH Model Exceedances (Eurozone Crisis) 
Test 
Sample 
Backtesting 
Expected Exceedances Actual Exceedances 
United Kingdom 65 75 
United States 62 77 
Canada 63 86 
France 64 77 
Germany 64 77 
Italy 63 73 
Japan 61 59 
Brazil 61 62 
China 62 58 
India 61 56 
Russia 62 73 
Spain 63 69 
Portugal 62 82 
Greece 65 57 
Ireland 64 73 
Table 11 reports the test statistics at 95% confidence levels, together with their p-values. In 
the Table 11, most samples cannot reject the null hypothesis of correct exeedances, while 
Canada S&P/TSX composite index reject the null hypothesis for both tests (p-values are 
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0.00651 for Kupiec and 0.00087 for Christoffersen), and Portugal PSI Geral index reject the 
null hypothesis for unconditional coverage Test (p-value is 0.01768 for Kupiec). Last but not 
the least, E-GARCH (1, 1) model with Generalized Error Distribution (GED) is valid for the 
majority of selected stock indices to give adequate volatility forecasting for VaR values. 
Table 11 E-GARCH Model Backtesting (Eurozone Crisis) 
Test 
Sample 
Backtesting 
Unconditional Coverage Tests  Conditional Coverage Tests  
Likelihood Ratio 
statistic 
p-value 
Likelihood Ratio 
statistic 
p-value 
United 
Kingdom 
1.54632  0.21368 2.20237  0.33248 
United States 3.11494  0.07758 3.91699  0.14107 
Canada 7.40428  0.00651 14.08299  0.00087 
France 2.57473  0.10858 3.00008  0.22312 
Germany 2.59607  0.10713 4.69605  0.09556 
Italy 1.35240  0.24486 1.36151  0.50623 
Japan 0.11709  0.73221 0.59757  0.74172 
Brazil 0.00004  0.99480 0.49288  0.78158 
China 0.29109  0.58953 0.51490  0.77302 
India 0.61068  0.43453 1.90991  0.38483 
Russia 1.69562  0.19286 1.83655  0.39921 
Spain 0.41808  0.51790 0.58728  0.74554 
Portugal 5.62756  0.01768 5.71398  0.05744 
Greece 1.13162  0.28743 1.98547  0.37056 
Ireland 1.27693  0.25847 2.08760  0.35211 
Note: Unconditional Coverage Test Null Hypothesis (Kupiec): Correct Exceedances; 
Conditional Coverage Test (Christoffersen) Null Hypothesis: Correct Exceedances & 
Independent. 
4.1.5 Granger Causality Test (Eurozone Crisis) 
That being the case, the E-GARCH (1, 1) VaR model with Generalized Error Distribution 
(GED) is valid for selected stock indices. It is possible to verify the spillover effects among 
the selected stock markets. Since Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland suffer the largest effects 
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in the Eurozone Crisis, Spain IBEX 35, Portugal PSI Geral, Greece FTSE/ATHEX LARGE 
CA (Athex 20) and Ireland ISEQ Overall Price stock indices are used in turns to find whether 
the selected stock indices have risk spillover effects. Additionally, Granger Causality Test in 
this part is estimated at a confidence level of 95%, while the lag value in each test is selected 
with minimum Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) value. 
4.1.5.1 Granger Causality Test for Spain IBEX 35 
Table 12 indicates the Granger Causality Test statistics for Spain IBEX 35 at a 95% 
significant level, along with the p-values, where the null hypothesis here is former index does 
not Granger cause the latter one (United Kingdom=>Spain means that United Kingdom FTSE 
100 does not Granger cause Spain IBEX 35). 
There is extreme contagion effect of five cases, where Spain IBEX 35 is the Granger cause 
for India BSE SENSEX, Russia RTS Index, Portugal PSI Geral and Greece FTSE/ATHEX 
LARGE CA (Athex 20). Then, United States Dow Jones Industrial Average and Spain IBEX 
35, each of the two series Granger causes the other. The same condition appears in Italy 
FTSE MIB, Japan Nikkei 225, Brazil Ibovespa, China SSE Composite Index. That means that 
when negative shocks arises and Spain IBEX 35 has decreases sharply in the returns, the past 
daily return information of Spain IBEX 35 could conduce to the predict the risk in the other 
indices (United States Dow Jones Industrial Average, Italy FTSE MIB, Japan Nikkei 225, 
Brazil Ibovespa, China SSE Composite Index). It is interesting that France CAC 40 is the 
Granger Cause of Spain IBEX 35 (p-value is 0.02). Despite France is not the country which 
suffers the most serious problem in the Eurozone Crisis, it is a proof of regional contagion 
effect as well. On the other hand, there is no significant risk transmission between other stock 
indices groups, since the p-values are over 0.05 and cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
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Table 12 Granger Causality Test for Spain (Eurozone Crisis) 
                           Cause 
Samples 
Spain 
Statistics p-value Lag
United Kingdom=>Spain 1.12310  0.34370  
4 
Spain=>United Kingdom 0.54310  0.70410  
United States=>Spain 2.26140  0.02706  
7 
Spain=>United States 2.72950  0.00803  
Canada=>Spain 1.23970  0.27710  
7 
Spain=>Canada 1.58660  0.13460  
France=>Spain 2.92260  0.02000  
4 
Spain=>France 2.04590  0.08542  
Germany=>Spain 1.34790  0.24980  
4 
Spain=>Germany 0.11550  0.97710  
Italy=>Spain 2.47390  0.04250  
4 
Spain=>Italy 2.51330  0.03980  
Japan=>Spain 4.38830  0.03629  
1 
Spain=>Japan 196.59810  0.00000  
Brazil=>Spain 9.62380  0.00194  
1 
Spain=>Brazil 4.48650  0.03426  
China=>Spain 6.04900  0.01398  
1 
Spain=>China 19.30660  0.00001  
India=>Spain 1.65380  0.19150  
2 
Spain=>India 9.77490  0.00006  
Russia=>Spain 0.34050  0.55960  
1 
Spain=>Russia 5.68060  0.01723  
Portugal=>Spain 1.45590  0.21310  
4 
Spain=>Portugal 2.43600  0.04525  
Greece=>Spain 2.16970  0.06998  
4 
Spain=>Greece 4.02500  0.00295  
Ireland=>Spain 1.49410  0.20130  
4 
Spain=>Ireland 1.03050  0.39000  
4.1.5.2 Granger Causality Test for Portugal PSI Geral 
Similar to the results of Spain IBEX 35, Table 13 presents the Granger Causality Test 
statistics for Portugal PSI Geral at a 95% significant level, along with the p-values. It is found 
that the presence of extreme downside shifts in the Portugal PSI Geral contributes to predict 
negative events in Canada S&P/TSX Composite Index, India BSE SENSEX, Russia RTS 
Index and Ireland ISEQ Overall Price stock indices, since Portugal PSI Geral is rejected the 
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null hypothesis for these four series. Moreover, Brazil Ibovespa and China SSE Composite 
Index can Granger cause Portugal PSI Geral, while Portugal PSI Geral can Granger cause 
each of them as well. Two sides have a bidirectional relationship in the stock indices.  
Table 13 Granger Causality Test for Portugal (Eurozone Crisis) 
                           Cause 
Samples 
Portugal 
Statistics p-value Lag
United Kingdom=>Portugal 0.39100  0.53180  
1 
Portugal=>United Kingdom 1.63660  0.20090  
United States=>Portugal 6.14400  0.00006  
4 
Portugal=>United States 1.70300  0.14650  
Canada=>Portugal 1.56020  0.12160  
9 
Portugal=>Canada 2.15310  0.02254  
France=>Portugal 0.02290  0.87980  
1 
Portugal=>France 2.09060  0.14830  
Germany=>Portugal 0.09440  0.75870  
1 
Portugal=>Germany 0.05360  0.81700  
Italy=>Portugal 2.49590  0.11430  
1 
Portugal=>Italy 2.08160  0.14920  
Japan=>Portugal 7.21410  0.00728  
1 
Portugal=>Japan 100.00090  0.00000  
Brazil=>Portugal 29.95650  0.00000  
1 
Portugal=>Brazil 6.89290  0.00871  
China=>Portugal 6.23180  0.01261  
1 
Portugal=>China 18.86620  0.00001  
India=>Portugal 1.51490  0.21850  
1 
Portugal=>India 8.25300  0.00410  
Russia=>Portugal 0.79820  0.37170  
1 
Portugal=>Russia 8.39530  0.00380  
Spain=>Portugal 2.43600  0.04525  
4 
Portugal=>Spain 1.45590  0.21310  
Greece=>Portugal 5.91800  0.00010  
4 
Portugal=>Greece 1.40410  0.23000  
Ireland=>Portugal 0.63480  0.42570  
1 
Portugal=>Ireland 4.71090  0.03007  
Finally, United States Dow Jones Industrial Average, Spain IBEX and Greece FTSE/ATHEX 
LARGE CA (Athex 20) reject the null hypothesis, which indicates they are the Granger 
causes for the volatility of Portugal PSI Geral. Therefore, when the stock markets of United 
43

States, Spain and Greece suffer extreme downside drops, Portugal PSI Geral index would 
have the contagion risk possibly. 
4.1.5.3 Granger Causality Test for Greece FTSE/ATHEX LARGE CA (Athex 20) 
The Greek government debt crisis has made a threat to European and even global financial 
markets since the crisis began in 2010. Thus, the Greek data is meaningful for studying the 
risk spillover. In the Table 14, Granger Causality Test statistics for Greece FTSE/ATHEX 
LARGE CA (Athex 20) are shown with p-values. As mentioned before, the confidence level 
stays as 95% level for all the tests. 
In one aspect, declines in Greece FTSE/ATHEX LARGE CA (Athex 20) can help to forecast 
the negative shocks for Japan Nikkei 225, China SSE Composite Index, India BSE SENSEX 
and Portugal PSI Geral Greece FTSE/ATHEX LARGE CA (Athex 20), because Greece 
FTSE/ATHEX LARGE CA (Athex 20) is the Granger cause of these stock indices. In the 
other aspect, United Kingdom FTSE 100, United States Dow Jones Industrial Average, 
Canada S&P/TSX Composite Index, Germany DAX, Italy FTSE MIB, France CAC 40, 
Brazil Ibovespa and Spain IBEX 35 reject the null hypothesis, which means they are the 
Granger causes for extreme downside shifts in the Greece FTSE/ATHEX LARGE CA (Athex 
20). There is no stock index in the samples that interact with Greece FTSE/ATHEX LARGE 
CA (Athex 20) or being Granger cause for each other. The majority of the selected stock 
indices show significant contagion effects, whereas Russia RTS Index and Ireland ISEQ 
Overall Price reflect no significant risk transmission with Greece FTSE/ATHEX LARGE CA 
(Athex 20), since the p-values are over 0.05 and cannot reject the null hypothesis for two 
sides. 
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Table 14 Granger Causality Test for Greece (Eurozone Crisis) 
                           Cause 
Samples 
Greece 
Statistics p-value Lag
United Kingdom=>Greece 5.19160  0.00562  
2 
Greece=>United Kingdom 2.34690  0.09587  
United States=>Greece 11.03990  0.00000  
3 
Greece=>United States 0.70540  0.54880  
Canada=>Greece 6.93730  0.00012  
3 
Greece=>Canada 0.91600  0.43230  
France=>Greece 3.46850  0.03131  
2 
Greece=>France 1.76350  0.17160  
Germany=>Greece 5.65360  0.01749  
1 
Greece=>Germany 1.36390  0.24300  
Italy=>Greece 7.88070  0.00039  
2 
Greece=>Italy 2.99650  0.05014  
Japan=>Greece 0.46030  0.63120  
2 
Greece=>Japan 14.34200  0.00000  
Brazil=>Greece 22.30730  0.00000  
1 
Greece=>Brazil 3.83320  0.05036  
China=>Greece 0.28330  0.75330  
2 
Greece=>China 3.68050  0.02535  
India=>Greece 0.38640  0.53430  
1 
Greece=>India 5.86820  0.01549  
Russia=>Greece 2.87030  0.05687  
2 
Greece=>Russia 0.52890  0.58930  
Spain=>Greece 4.02500  0.00295  
4 
Greece=>Spain 2.16970  0.06998  
Portugal=>Greece 1.40410  0.23000  
4 
Greece=>Portugal 5.91800  0.00010  
Ireland=>Greece 1.30130  0.27240  
2 
Greece=>Ireland 2.18750  0.11240  
4.1.5.4 Granger Causality Test for Ireland ISEQ Overall Price 
The last benchmark stock index for Eurozone Crisis is the Ireland ISEQ Overall Price. As 
shown in the Table 15, Granger Causality Test statistics for Ireland ISEQ Overall Price is the 
Granger cause for Japan Nikkei 225, China SSE Composite Index and India  BSE 
SENSEX at a 95% significant level. It indicates that Ireland ISEQ Overall Price contributes 
to predict the extreme negative events for Japan Nikkei 225, China SSE Composite Index and 
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India BSE SENSEX. Also, United Kingdom FTSE 100, United States Dow Jones Industrial 
Average, Canada S&P/TSX Composite Index, Germany DAX, Italy FTSE MIB, Brazil 
Ibovespa and Portugal PSI Geral reject the null hypothesis that they are the Granger cause for 
Ireland ISEQ Overall Price. However, others have not presented any significant evidence. 
Notably, there is no series could interact with testing stock indices (Greece and Ireland). 
Table 15 Granger Causality Test for Ireland (Eurozone Crisis) 
                           Cause 
Samples 
Ireland 
Statistics p-value Lag
United Kingdom=>Ireland 3.08040  0.04611  
2 
Ireland=>United Kingdom 0.01880  0.98140  
United States=>Ireland 25.44800  0.00000  
3 
Ireland=>United States 0.90230  0.43920  
Canada=>Ireland 15.20390  0.00000  
3 
Ireland=>Canada 0.61570  0.60480  
France=>Ireland 2.16490  0.11500  
2 
Ireland=>France 0.03980  0.96100  
Germany=>Ireland 4.98460  0.00691  
2 
Ireland=>Germany 0.00691  0.26440  
Italy=>Ireland 3.75810  0.02346  
2 
Ireland=>Italy 0.50150  0.60570  
Japan=>Ireland 0.03510  0.96550  
2 
Ireland=>Japan 82.76850  0.00000  
Brazil=>Ireland 25.72070  0.00000  
1 
Ireland=>Brazil 1.13310  0.28720  
China=>Ireland 1.48640  0.22290  
1 
Ireland=>China 21.95970  0.00000  
India=>Ireland 0.03390  0.96660  
2 
Ireland=>India 5.77890  0.00314  
Russia=>Ireland 0.03640  0.84870  
1 
Ireland=>Russia 1.86040  0.17270  
Spain=>Ireland 1.03050  0.39000  
4 
Ireland=>Spain 1.49410  0.20130  
Portugal=>Ireland 4.71090  0.03007  
1 
Ireland=>Portugal 0.63480  0.42570  
Greece=>Ireland 2.18750  0.11240  
2 
Ireland=>Greece 1.30130  0.27240  
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4.2 Asian Crisis 
4.2.1 Date Requirement (Asian Crisis) 
Eurozone Crisis has happened in the developed countries and spillover to the global markets, 
but it is not enough that we need another crisis to compare with Eurozone Crisis. Aim at this, 
Asian Crisis happened in 1997 is a reasonable decision that the crisis came from Thailand and 
transmit to the whole world speedily. 
As pointed out earlier, the first process is to build E-GARCH (1, 1) VaR model for selected 
stock indices. The data is still the daily stock close prices with log returns, which are from 
January 1st 1997 to December 31st 1999 obtained from DataStream that covers the Asian 
Crisis. Our samples include three types of stock indices. The developed markets (G7 groups: 
US Dow Jones Industrial Average, Canada S&P/TSX Composite Index, France CAC 40, 
Germany DAX, Italy FTSE MIB, UK FTSE 100 and Japan Nikkei 225) and emerging 
markets (the four countries of BRICs: Brazil Ibovespa, India BSE SENSEX, China SSE 
Composite Index and Russia RTS Index) stock indices stay the same, while benchmark 
markets stock indices are changed (the countries suffer the most loss in the Asian Crisis: 
Indonesia JSX Composite, South Korea KOSPI and Thailand SET Index). 
All the plotting of stock indices in the Asian Crisis are shown in the appendix (from Figure 
31 to Figure 44), while the plotting of returns are shown in the appendix as well (from Figure 
45 to Figure 58). 
4.2.2 Data Description (Asian Crisis) 
As same as Eurozone Crisis, Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) indicates that (Table 16) 
all the selected stock indices of the Asian Crisis with log returns are stationary, since all the 
p-values are under 0.05. 
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Table 16 Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Asian Crisis) 
                 Test 
Sample 
Unit Root (ADF test) 
statistics p-value Critical Values 
United Kingdom -17.26300  0.00000 1% level -3.43000  
United States -8.89480  0.00000 5% level -2.86000  
Canada -14.04040  0.00000 10% level -2.57000  
France -11.34830  0.00000 
  
Germany -19.83790  0.00000 
Italy -8.63470  0.00000 
Japan -16.30660  0.00000 
Brazil -6.66620  0.00000 
China -12.62290  0.00000 
India -13.37860  0.00000 
Russia -17.06510  0.00000 
Indonesia -15.85790  0.00000 
South Korea -9.01690  0.00000 
Thailand -17.32100  0.00000 
Table 17 Description of Samples (Eurozone Crisis) 
          Statistic 
Sample 
Description 
Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
United Kingdom 0.00067  0.01130  -0.07462  0.93819 
United States 0.00091  0.01189  -0.44151  3.94583 
Canada 0.00046  0.01006  -0.89229  5.44626 
France 0.00129  0.01432  -0.21189  1.63125 
Germany 0.00119  0.01568  -0.43206  1.65877 
Italy 0.00109  0.01735  -0.15338  1.56089 
Japan -0.00004  0.01602  0.11846  1.74435 
Brazil 0.00085  0.03277  0.62569  11.78025 
China 0.00051  0.01755  -0.61861  5.19438 
India 0.00025  0.01769  0.21546  1.80731 
Russia -0.00013  0.03813  -0.35115  3.92916 
Indonesia -0.00012  0.02711  0.32334  3.22077 
South Korea 0.00050  0.02994  0.16769  0.89570 
Thailand -0.00067  0.02495  0.83102  2.36565 
In the Table 17, it reflects the main features of daily log returns of the 14 indices during the 
Asian Crisis. The trend that significant skewness and kurtosis is not restricted to Eurozone 
Crisis, but is also evident for all the selected stock indices of Asian crisis. Thus, all the 
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indices for Asian crisis tend to hold fat tails and left skewness. Considering the main features, 
standard Normal Distribution would not be able to fit the samples adequately in this respect.  
Concretely, the statistics of Jarque-Bera (JB) test and Ljung-Box Q-statistic for selected stock 
indices are given in the Table 18. The null hypothesis of Normal Distribution is rejected for 
all the samples at any level of significance in the Jarque-Bera (JB) test that it supports the 
judgment of significant skewness and kurtosis. At a 95% significant level, there exists a high 
serial correlation in the variance for the squared series with order 7, what is tested by 
Ljung-Box Q-statistic. 
Table 18 Description of Samples (Asian Crisis) 
         Statistic 
Sample 
Description 
JB Statistics JB p-value LB Q(7) LB p-value 
United Kingdom 30.02880  0.00000  140.88440  0.00000  
United States 519.68930  0.00000  74.42450  0.00000  
Canada 1063.29000  0.00000  66.91600  0.00000  
France 90.29350  0.00000  146.07550  0.00000  
Germany 110.99970  0.00000  152.93340  0.00000  
Italy 54.87560  0.00000  265.85050  0.00000  
Japan 96.42640  0.00000  114.20560  0.00000  
Brazil 4069.96100  0.00000  75.24120  0.00000  
China 936.33800  0.00000  116.34060  0.00000  
India 89.36540  0.00000  16.09820  0.02423  
Russia 523.71940  0.00000  83.82890  0.00000  
Indonesia 283.54020  0.00000  30.06630  0.00009  
South Korea 24.04210  0.00001  83.66890  0.00000  
Thailand 258.10760  0.00000  80.44710  0.00000  
4.2.3 Estimation of E-GARCH VaR Models (Asian Crisis) 
The second process is to fit E-GARCH (1, 1) Model for all the selected stock indices, where 
the confidence level to evaluate the performance of assumption here is 95% as well as the 
Eurozone Crisis. In Table 19 and Table 20, parameter values for fitting E-GARCH (1, 1) VaR 
models with Generalized Error Distribution (GED) have shown in the first row of each stock 
index, while the second row presents the p-values for different parameters. 
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As the results in Table 19 and Table 20, the parameters are estimated by the model of 
E-GARCH (1, 1) under the Generalized Error Distribution (GED). There are several indices 
have not passed the 95% confidence level with some parameters, such like the stock indices 
of Japan, China, India and South Korea, which brings doubts on the assumptions of choosing 
distribution and model. This will be discussed in Backtesting Section and Limitation Section 
later. 
Table 19 E-GARCH Model Parameters 1-2 (Asian Crisis) 
Estimate 
Sample 
E-GARCH Model Parameters 
Mean AR Term MA Term Constant 
United Kingdom 
0.00065 -0.17174 0.29090 -0.15250 
0.06383 0.25143 0.04202 0.00000 
United States 
0.00079 0.08965 -0.07353 -0.70033 
0.03614 0.51359 0.59263 0.00000 
Canada 
0.00098 -0.11836 0.33748 -0.37103 
0.00096 0.18371 0.00007 0.00070 
France 
0.00133 0.09066 -0.00789 -0.34091 
0.00009 0.00268 0.60587 0.00000 
Germany 
0.00175 -0.15215 0.20758 -0.35410 
0.00195 0.02340 0.00112 0.00000 
Italy 
0.00148 0.96507 -0.91714 -0.33714 
0.12627 0.00000 0.00000 0.01419 
Japan 
-0.00004 0.38407 -0.45564 -0.22923 
0.72469 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
Brazil 
0.00184 0.35796 -0.28043 -0.53965 
0.02502 0.00000 0.00000 0.00004 
China 
0.00000 0.23988 -0.23988 -1.05014 
0.99948 0.00000 0.00000 0.00046 
India 
0.00003 -0.42194 0.51416 -1.41254 
0.96391 0.42473 0.29524 0.01537 
Russia 
0.00071 0.40417 -0.23401 -0.82232 
0.08415 0.00000 0.00002 0.00195 
Indonesia 
-0.00198 0.19687 -0.07442 -0.81062 
0.00001 0.00000 0.00655 0.01591 
South Korea 
-0.00011 -0.26295 0.39256 -0.19589 
0.75815 0.00398 0.00004 0.00495 
Thailand 
-0.00302 0.42572 -0.30422 -2.41303 
0.00440 0.00000 0.00134 0.04782 
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Table 20 E-GARCH Model Parameters 2-2 (Asian Crisis) 
Estimate 
Sample 
E-GARCH Model Parameters 
ARCH 
Term 
GARCH 
Term 
Asymmetry 
Term 
Shape Log-Likelihood 
United 
Kingdom 
-0.08549 0.98335 0.08682 1.72883 
2457.50200 
0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
United States 
-0.19182 0.92257 0.08465 1.65179 
2341.98600 
0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
Canada 
-0.10239 0.96114 0.14224 1.30120 
2559.11500 
0.00139 0.00000 0.18992 0.00000 
France 
-0.09790 0.96058 0.09602 1.63870 
2179.90400 
0.00000 0.00000 0.00010 0.00000 
Germany 
-0.09228 0.95865 0.14267 1.66337 
2125.78800 
0.00012 0.00000 0.00013 0.00000 
Italy 
-0.07945 0.96016 0.28294 1.76276 
1414.42600 
0.03783 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
Japan 
-0.07182 0.97301 0.13463 1.54228 
2057.76400 
0.00091 0.00000 0.01080 0.00000 
Brazil 
-0.23511 0.92852 0.27329 1.57810 
1579.88300 
0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
China 
-0.06898 0.87362 0.52965 0.93458 
2208.18700 
0.12281 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
India 
-0.13104 0.82597 0.12199 1.60997 
1619.56300 
0.00139 0.00000 0.04727 0.00000 
Russia 
-0.03282 0.87867 0.47933 1.20101 
1568.97900 
0.43239 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
Indonesia 
-0.10893 0.88954 0.46216 1.04149 
1459.35400 
0.02528 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
South Korea 
-0.01290 0.97239 0.19836 1.35651 
1335.90500 
0.62674 0.00000 0.00003 0.00000 
Thailand 
0.08008 0.67915 0.33261 1.31912 
1727.97100 
0.24526 0.00003 0.00018 0.00000 
Ljung-Box Q-statistics test is generated for both Standardized Residuals and Standardized 
Squared Residuals with 1, 5 and 9 lags to check whether the model has collected all the 
necessary information. Table 21 presents the Ljung-Box Q-statistics for Standardized 
Residuals of the selected stock indices at a 95% significant level. The majority of the samples 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of randomness with 1, 5 and 9 lags, while France CAC 40 
with 5 and 9 lags can reject the null hypothesis that France CAC 40 might have 
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autocorrelation from the samples. This condition is not confined to France CAC 40, but is 
also significant for Russia RTS Index (with 1, 5 and 9 lags), Indonesia JSX Composite (with 
1, 5 and 9 lags) and Thailand SET Index (with 1 and 5 lags). These stock indices have not 
shown independent distribution, where there might exist autocorrelations from the samples.  
It seems that E-GARCH (1, 1) VaR model with Generalized Error Distribution (GED) does 
not fit all the selected stock indices very well, but Ljung-Box Q-statistics test for 
Standardized Squared Residuals and Weighted ARCH Lagrange Multiplier Test reflect 
different results. When focus on Ljung-Box Q-statistics test for Standardized Squared 
Residuals, all the samples cannot reject the null hypothesis of randomness, except for China 
SSE Composite Index (Table 22). Whats more, Table 23 supports the results of Ljung-Box 
Q-statistics test for Standardized Squared Residuals that only Japan Nikkei 225 with 3 lags 
can reject the null hypothesis of no ARCH effect (p-value is 0.03695), while all the others 
cannot reject the null hypothesis by applying a 95% confidence level (Table 23). Generally 
speaking, combined with other evidences, the residuals left are white noise, which means all 
valuable information has been collected. Thus, E-GARCH (1, 1) VaR model with Generalized 
Error Distribution (GED) can fit selected stock indices in Asian crisis adequately. 
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Table 21 E-GARCH Model Tests 1-3 (Asian Crisis) 
Test 
Sample 
E-GARCH Model Tests 
LB Test on Standardized Residuals 
lag=1 lag=5 lag=9 
United Kingdom 
0.23840 3.67810 7.95160 
0.62536 0.14237 0.06007 
United States 
0.03571 2.48249 5.42972 
0.85010 0.78790 0.36110 
Canada 
0.04446 2.91144 5.64108 
0.83300 0.52830 0.31970 
France 
0.09053 4.39816 8.70511 
0.76350 0.02242 0.03122 
Germany 
0.19600 0.71340 1.30680 
0.65800 1.00000 0.99880 
Italy 
0.93370 2.52880 4.21990 
0.33390 0.76320 0.63880 
Japan 
0.00132 2.73952 4.35470 
0.97110 0.63820 0.60630 
Brazil 
0.76370 2.46730 4.65970 
0.38220 0.79580 0.53300 
China 
1.06200 3.22100 4.47300 
0.30280 0.34070 0.57770 
India 
0.03669 1.24987 4.83340 
0.84810 0.99980 0.49200 
Russia 
4.86200 7.06300 9.88900 
0.02745 0.00000 0.01028 
Indonesia 
6.28100 7.56600 8.26400 
0.01221 0.00000 0.04606 
South Korea 
0.58740 1.28060 3.31910 
0.44340 0.99970 0.83660 
Thailand 
4.54900 4.68800 5.19900 
0.03295 0.00925 0.40945 
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Table 22 E-GARCH Model Tests 2-3 (Asian Crisis) 
           Test 
Sample 
E-GARCH Model Tests 
LB Test on Standardized Squared Residuals 
lag=1 lag=5 lag=9 
United Kingdom 
1.10900 2.38300 3.67600 
0.29220 0.53100 0.64410 
United States 
0.18990 2.17490 3.31970 
0.66300 0.57770 0.70520 
Canada 
0.21850 0.75280 1.33200 
0.64020 0.91260 0.96820 
France 
0.14350 0.75410 2.79680 
0.70490 0.91230 0.79200 
Germany 
3.15200 4.00500 5.77200 
0.07584 0.25341 0.32529 
Italy 
0.51130 1.29620 4.51960 
0.47460 0.78980 0.50320 
Japan 
0.91480 4.40810 6.55240 
0.33880 0.20740 0.23960 
Brazil 
0.91010 3.46170 4.63300 
0.34010 0.32920 0.48520 
China 
11.49000 13.45000 14.48000 
0.00070 0.00115 0.00477 
India 
0.08551 0.64175 1.50906 
0.77000 0.93380 0.95480 
Russia 
0.07013 0.48276 2.56812 
0.79110 0.96030 0.82750 
Indonesia 
0.16930 0.39290 0.73560 
0.68070 0.97290 0.99470 
South Korea 
0.00258 0.66081 2.22413 
0.95950 0.93030 0.87660 
Thailand 
0.25250 3.47340 5.03870 
0.61530 0.32740 0.42370 
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Table 23 E-GARCH Model Tests 3-3 (Asian Crisis) 
           Test 
Sample 
E-GARCH Model Tests 
Weighted ARCH LM Tests 
lag=1 lag=5 lag=9 
United Kingdom 
0.31460 2.50510 2.79990 
0.57490 0.37010 0.55210 
United States 
0.85470 2.38280 2.89990 
0.35520 0.39270 0.53270 
Canada 
0.14900 0.55850 0.98360 
0.69950 0.86620 0.91620 
France 
0.72180 0.94130 2.86760 
0.39560 0.75040 0.53890 
Germany 
0.31380 1.39290 2.85880 
0.57530 0.62090 0.54060 
Italy 
0.20250 1.36180 4.75540 
0.65270 0.62940 0.25040 
Japan 
4.35300 5.64800 6.63300 
0.03695 0.07264 0.10404 
Brazil 
0.99730 1.19360 1.31620 
0.31800 0.67650 0.85740 
China 
0.05566 1.05500 1.38437 
0.81350 0.71670 0.84420 
India 
0.01199 0.93618 1.51114 
0.91280 0.75200 0.81910 
Russia 
0.15680 0.69580 2.04520 
0.69210 0.82470 0.70780 
Indonesia 
0.10210 0.42950 0.53200 
0.74930 0.90420 0.97540 
South Korea 
0.50280 1.25160 2.61100 
0.47830 0.66000 0.58980 
Thailand 
3.43200 4.84000 5.45200 
0.06396 0.11189 0.18263 
4.2.4 Backtesting (Asian Crisis) 
After estimating E-GARCH (1, 1) VaR model with Generalized Error Distribution (GED), 
backtesting should be taken into account as a critical part of risk measurement. Model 
validation should be checked by Unconditional Coverage Test (Kupiec) as well as 
Conditional Coverage Test (Christoffersen). Definitely, the confidence level applied in the 
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tests is still at 95% level. 
The violations of selected stock indices are listed in the Table 24 that actual exceedances are 
fairly closed to expected exceedances. Although actual exceedances of some stock indices are 
more than expected exceedances, Unconditional Coverage Test (Kupiec) and Conditional 
Coverage Test (Christoffersen) would put the model validation into evaluation to judge 
whether the exceedances are correct. 
In the Table 25, most samples cannot reject the null hypothesis of correct exeedances that the 
model is valid for most selected stock indices. However, both Indonesia JSX Composite 
(p-values are 0.04792 for Kupiec and 0.01403 for Christoffersen) and Thailand SET Index 
(p-values are 0.00047 for Kupiec and 0.00166 for Christoffersen) reject the null hypothesis 
for both tests. It is interesting that both the counties suffered the most loss in the Asian crisis, 
and the indices of these two counties have sharp drops in returns and fat tails in volatility. 
E-GARCH (1, 1) model with Generalized Error Distribution (GED) might not be able to 
cover all the features these samples required, so changing for other GARCH model (other 
GARCH orders and other GARCH family members) or other skewed distribution (Skewed 
Student-t distribution, Skewed Generalized Error distribution and so on) may improve the 
results. The further explanation would be discussed in Limitation section. 
In general, E-GARCH (1, 1) model with Generalized Error Distribution (GED) is still a valid 
model for the majority of samples to predict volatility accurately for VaR values. 
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Table 24 E-GARCH Model Exceedances (Asian Crisis) 
Test 
Sample 
Backtesting 
Expected Exceedances Actual Exceedances 
United Kingdom 39 43 
United States 37 43 
Canada 38 39 
France 37 44 
Germany 37 48 
Italy 25 29 
Japan 36 42 
Brazil 34 39 
China 39 30 
India 30 23 
Russia 39 32 
Indonesia 31 21 
South Korea 30 27 
Thailand 36 18 
Table 25 E-GARCH Model Backtesting (Asian Crisis) 
Test 
Sample 
Backtesting 
Unconditional Coverage Tests  Conditional Coverage Tests  
Likelihood Ratio 
statistic 
p-value 
Likelihood Ratio 
statistic 
p-value 
United 
Kingdom 
0.39719  0.52855 0.46425  0.79285 
United States 0.72237  0.39537 0.82045  0.66350 
Canada 0.00551  0.94083 0.00585  0.99708 
France 1.08984  0.29651 3.16802  0.20515 
Germany 2.79505  0.09456 3.27157  0.19480 
Italy 0.49977  0.47960 3.29446  0.19258 
Japan 0.74120  0.38928 0.93320  0.62713 
Brazil 0.58025  0.44621 1.48844  0.47510 
China 2.41551  0.12014 1.18924  0.55177 
India 2.13974  0.14353 2.16073  0.33947 
Russia 1.44290  0.22967 1.78600  0.40943 
Indonesia 3.91283  0.04792 8.53289  0.01403 
South Korea 0.50115  0.47900 1.01451  0.60215 
Thailand 12.25049  0.00047 12.80362  0.00166 
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Note: Unconditional Coverage Test Null Hypothesis (Kupiec): Correct Exceedances; 
Conditional Coverage Test (Christoffersen) Null Hypothesis: Correct Exceedances & 
Independent 
4.2.5 Granger Causality Test (Asian Crisis) 
The final process is to check whether there exists contagion risk among the selected stock 
markets. Indonesia JSX Composite, South Korea KOSPI and Thailand SET Index are the 
benchmark indices to compare with developed markets as well as emerging markets because 
of the most loss that Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand suffered in Asian crisis. Note that a 
95%confidence level is still applied in Granger Causality Test, while the lag value in each test 
is selected with minimum Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) value. 
4.2.5.1 Granger Causality Test for Indonesia JSX Composite 
The null hypothesis here, that former index does not Granger cause the latter one (United 
Kingdom=> Indonesia means that United Kingdom FTSE 100 does not Granger cause 
Indonesia JSX Composite), is evaluated at confidence level of 95%, while p-values are also 
listed. 
As it is shown in Table 26, there are nine stock indices (UK FTSE 100, US Dow Jones 
Industrial Average, Canada S&P/TSX Composite Index, France CAC 40, Germany DAX, 
Italy FTSE MIB, Brazil Ibovespa, India BSE SENSEX, South Korea KOSPI) can Granger 
cause Indonesia JSX Composite, but the volatility of Indonesia JSX Composite is not 
responsible for their negative shocks. It is clear that Russia RTS Index and Thailand SET 
Index reject the null hypothesis, which indicates they are the Granger causes for Indonesia 
JSX Composite, while Indonesia JSX Composite can also be the Granger cause for each of 
them. In fact, two sides have significant interactions. Finally, there is no significant extreme 
contagion effect between other stock indices groups, since the p-values are over 0.05 and 
cannot reject the null hypothesis. Note that Indonesia JSX Composite cannot influence other 
stock indices without interaction. The reason is that Indonesia might be the victim and 
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transmitter in the Asian crisis rather than the originator. 
Table 26 Granger Causality Test for Indonesia (Asian Crisis) 
                           Cause 
Samples 
Indonesia 
Statistics p-value Lag
United Kingdom=>Indonesia 19.42040  0.00001  
1 
Indonesia=>United Kingdom 0.25590  0.61300  
United States=>Indonesia 53.92180  0.00000  
1 
Indonesia=>United States 1.97260  0.16040  
Canada=>Indonesia 52.58780  0.00000  
1 
Indonesia=>Canada 1.23520  0.26660  
France=>Indonesia 23.57120  0.00000  
1 
Indonesia=>France 0.00360  0.95200  
Germany=>Indonesia 16.54610  0.00005  
1 
Indonesia=>Germany 0.69300  0.40530  
Italy=>Indonesia 4.70050  0.03040  
1 
Indonesia=>Italy 0.04240  0.83690  
Japan=>Indonesia 0.89380  0.40940  
2 
Indonesia=>Japan 2.63850  0.07190  
Brazil=>Indonesia 39.33260  0.00000  
1 
Indonesia=>Brazil 2.23930  0.13480  
China=>Indonesia 1.13970  0.33180  
3 
Indonesia=>China 1.66670  0.17240  
India=>Indonesia 4.72820  0.02987  
1 
Indonesia=>India 0.38800  0.53350  
Russia=>Indonesia 3.34010  0.03576  
2 
Indonesia=>Russia 4.55280  0.01072  
South Korea=>Indonesia 9.50600  0.00000  
5 
Indonesia=>South Korea 0.35370  0.88000  
Thailand=>Indonesia 9.39010  0.00223  
1 
Indonesia=>Thailand 8.07010  0.00458  
4.2.5.2 Granger Causality Test for South Korea KOSPI 
The similar trend is presented by South Korea KOSPI. Table 27 indicates the Granger 
Causality Test statistics for South Korea KOSPI at a 95% significant level, along with the 
p-values. When negative downside shifts come in these seven stock indices (UK  FTSE 
100, US Dow Jones Industrial Average, Canada S&P/TSX Composite Index, France CAC 40, 
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Germany DAX, Brazil Ibovespa and Russia RTS Index), their volatilities would help to 
understand and forecast the shocks of South Korea KOSPI, as these stock indices can 
Granger cause South Korea KOSPI. Additionally, Thailand SET Index can reject the null 
hypothesis (p-value is 0.00117), and South Korea KOSPI can Granger cause Thailand SET 
Index as well (p-value is 0.00684). Two sides are influenced and Granger caused each other. 
Among the samples, South Korea KOSPI can only be the Granger cause for Indonesia JSX 
Composite at a 95% confidence level. 
Table 27 Granger Causality Test for South Korea (Asian Crisis) 
                           Cause 
Samples 
South Korea 
Statistics p-value Lag
United Kingdom=>South Korea 21.05640  0.00000  
1 
South Korea=>United Kingdom 2.06260  0.15120  
United States=>South Korea 23.01890  0.00000  
1 
South Korea=>United States 0.20190  0.65330  
Canada=>South Korea 21.56160  0.00000  
1 
South Korea=>Canada 1.40270  0.23650  
France=>South Korea 9.97170  0.00163  
1 
South Korea=>France 1.17180  0.27930  
Germany=>South Korea 6.22350  0.01274  
1 
South Korea=>Germany 0.25150  0.61610  
Italy=>South Korea 3.69100  0.05500  
1 
South Korea=>Italy 0.00400  0.94930  
Japan=>South Korea 1.78730  0.16790  
2 
South Korea=>Japan 1.74980  0.17430  
Brazil=>South Korea 13.28130  0.00028  
1 
South Korea=>Brazil 1.52730  0.21680  
China=>South Korea 0.29790  0.82690  
3 
South Korea=>China 0.60420  0.61230  
India=>South Korea 0.00110  0.97380  
1 
South Korea=>India 1.25280  0.26330  
Russia=>South Korea 5.16470  0.02322  
1 
South Korea=>Russia 0.48790  0.48500  
Indonesia=>South Korea 0.35370  0.88000  
5 
South Korea=>Indonesia 9.50600  0.00000  
Thailand=>South Korea 6.79420  0.00117  
2 
South Korea=>Thailand 5.00710  0.00684  
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4.2.5.3 Granger Causality Test for Thailand SET Index 
The Asian crisis began with the currency shocks in Thailand and transmitted to the global 
market quickly in 1997. Therefore, Thailand SET Index has particular meaning for studying 
the contagion risk. In the Table 28, Granger Causality Test statistics for Thailand SET Index 
point out that UK FTSE 100, US Dow Jones Industrial Average, Canada S&P/TSX 
Composite Index, France CAC 40, Germany DAX, Italy FTSE MIB and Russia RTS Index 
can reject the null hypothesis at the confidence level of 95% level. That means significant 
declines in these markets could help to forecast the extreme downside shifts for Thailand SET 
Index. As mentioned before, Indonesia JSX Composite and South Korea KOSPI can Granger 
cause Thailand SET Index, while Thailand SET Index can also be Granger cause for them. 
There is no significant contagion effect between Thailand and other Asian countries, 
especially for China, Japan and India. 
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Table 28 Granger Causality Test for Thailand (Asian Crisis) 
                           Cause 
Samples 
Thailand 
Statistics p-value Lag
United Kingdom=>Thailand 7.50930  0.00057  
2 
Thailand=>United Kingdom 0.41550  0.66010  
United States=>Thailand 22.02820  0.00000  
1 
Thailand=>United States 1.52610  0.21690  
Canada=>Thailand 33.08880  0.00000  
1 
Thailand=>Canada 0.38380  0.53570  
France=>Thailand 13.36440  0.00027  
1 
Thailand=>France 0.06490  0.79900  
Germany=>Thailand 6.50360  0.00154  
2 
Thailand=>Germany 0.68740  0.50300  
Italy=>Thailand 9.20810  0.00248  
1 
Thailand=>Italy 0.03770  0.84620  
Japan=>Thailand 0.12810  0.87980  
2 
Thailand=>Japan 2.01520  0.13370  
Brazil=>Thailand 2.72620  0.09894  
1 
Thailand=>Brazil 0.11500  0.73460  
China=>Thailand 1.61740  0.18350  
3 
Thailand=>China 0.87280  0.45450  
India=>Thailand 3.00590  0.08323  
1 
Thailand=>India 0.02090  0.88500  
Russia=>Thailand 12.72620  0.00037  
1 
Thailand=>Russia 0.01410  0.90550  
Indonesia=>Thailand 8.07010  0.00458  
1 
Thailand=>Indonesia 9.39010  0.00223  
South Korea=>Thailand 5.00710  0.00684  
2 
Thailand=>South Korea 6.79420  0.00117  
4.3 Discussion 
Generally speaking, the results confirm that the validation of E-GARCH (1, 1) VaR model 
under Generalized Error Distribution (GED) can cover most stock indices in both Eurozone 
Crisis and Asian Crisis samples. Though the model is valid, some selected stock indices still 
reflect inadaptability in this study. 
For instance, the parameters of Spain IBEX 35 in the Eurozone Crisis are not statistically 
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significant to reject the null hypothesis that Mean, AR Term and MA Term indicate too large 
errors after modelling possibly (Table 5). Weighted ARCH Lagrange Multiplier Test supports 
this indication that Spain IBEX 35 cannot reject the null hypothesis with 5 and 7 lags, which 
means the residuals of Spain IBEX 35 are not white noise after modelling (Table 9). Another 
sample with problem is Canada S&P/TSX Composite Index that the only one cannot pass 
backtesting in the Eurozone Crisis. To be more specific, Canada S&P/TSX Composite Index 
indicates existing ARCH effect in the Ljung-Box Q-statistics Test on Standardized Squared 
Residuals (Table 8). As a consequence, it has rejected the null hypothesis for both tests in the 
backtesting that p-values are 0.00651 for Kupiec and 0.00087 for Christoffersen (Table 11). 
Unfortunately, this condition is not only limited to the samples in the Eurozone Crisis, but 
also expands to Indonesia JSX Composite and Thailand SET Index in the Asian Crisis (Table 
21 and Table 25). It means that E-GARCH (1, 1) VaR model under Generalized Error 
Distribution (GED) may not be able to fit some particular stock indices adequately. This 
problem will be explained in the Limitation Section later.  
However, it cannot be denied that the model can fit the majority of samples and give accurate 
forecasts. In spite of the rare indices, E-GARCH (1, 1) VaR model under Generalized Error 
Distribution (GED) is accepted for this studys objective. 
Actually, the target of this dissertation is to find the evidence of contagion risk out, so it is 
essential to compare the results of both selected financial crises. The Eurozone Crisis part 
gives significant evidence of risk spillover, either in the developed countries or emerging 
markets. As shown in Table 29, developed countries could affect the benchmark countries 
except for Japan. The volatility of benchmark countries is responsible for partial developed 
countries directly, while most developed countries would affect the rises and drops of 
benchmark countries. However, each one of developing countries can be influenced by or 
interact with benchmark countries, especially for China and India (Table 29). The reason why 
developed and developing countries have the difference is that developed countries have 
advanced financial system to protect their economies, but the imperfection in financial 
system of emerging markets makes it easy to receive the negative shocks form the originator. 
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Note that benchmark countries have significant risk spillover within their benchmark group, 
which appears to be a regional effect. There is no denying that the whole world suffered the 
effect of Eurozone Crisis. When a crisis happens, it would transmit from the originator to 
others. Some countries may play a role as transfer point to spread the extreme downside shifts 
to the whole world. For example, Germany is not influenced by the volatility of Spain directly. 
Spain IBEX 35 would pass the extreme event to Italy FTSE MIB at first, and Italy FTSE MIB 
acts as a transfer point to spread the event to Germany financial market. Some studies regard 
the American and Japanese stock markets as links for European markets to spread the 
volatility (Blundell-Wignall and Slovik, 2011). Even though some markets are not directly 
linked to the financial originator, the negative shocks could still arrive on these markets. 
Limited by time and design, this study cannot track the spreading order, but it is a good point 
to develop the further research. 
Table 29 Contagion Effect Summary (Eurozone Crisis) 
          Factor 
Sample 
Contagion Effect Summary 
Be Affected by Benchmark Affect Benchmark 
United Kingdom - Greece, Ireland 
United States Spain Portugal, Greece, Ireland 
Canada Portugal Greece, Ireland 
France - Spain, Greece 
Germany - Greece, Ireland 
Italy Spain Greece, Ireland 
Japan Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland - 
Brazil Spain, Portugal Greece, Ireland 
China Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland - 
India Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland - 
Russia Spain, Portugal - 
Spain - Portugal, Greece 
Portugal Spain, Greece Ireland 
Greece Spain Portugal 
Ireland Portugal - 
Note: Be affected by benchmark item includes the results influenced by and interact with 
benchmark countries. 
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However, the contagion effect summary for Asian Crisis is totally different. None of the G7 
group is affected by benchmark countries in the Asian Crisis, whereas all the developed 
countries can Granger cause the negative shifts in the benchmark countries except for Japan 
(Table 30). Even in the group of developing countries, only Russia RTS Index could interact 
with Indonesia JSX Composite stock index at a significant level to reflect the contagion effect, 
but most of them could affect the volatility of benchmark countries (Table 30). The extreme 
negative shifts in benchmark group do not affect the other markets although benchmark group 
is sensitive to all the selected stock indices analysed. As we know, the Asian Crisis in 1997 
swept the world rapidly after it happened. So many countries were involved into this event 
and suffered big loss. Probably the explanation for the results is because the crisis spread and 
transmitted to the whole world through transfer point, such as Russia or other correlated 
countries. There is no doubt that the contagion effect exists in the Asian Crisis, since 
significant evidence of interaction between the benchmark countries. Table 30 indicates that 
the contagion risk is also detected in the Asian Crisis. 
Table 30 Contagion Effect Summary (Asian Crisis) 
        Factor 
Sample 
Contagion Effect Summary 
Be Affected by Benchmark Affect Benchmark 
United Kingdom - Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand 
United States - Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand 
Canada - Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand 
France - Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand 
Germany - Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand 
Italy - Indonesia, Thailand 
Japan - - 
Brazil - Indonesia, South Korea 
China - - 
India - Indonesia 
Russia Indonesia South Korea, Thailand 
Indonesia South Korea, Thailand South Korea 
South Korea Thailand Indonesia, Thailand 
Thailand Indonesia, South Korea Indonesia, South Korea 
Note: Be affected by benchmark item includes the results influenced by and interact with 
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benchmark countries. 
Comparing the results of both Eurozone Crisis and Asian Crisis, the developed country group 
would affect the benchmark volatility but rare of them would be influenced directly. In 
contrast, emerging market group is more likely to be affected by the originator. As mentioned 
before, developed countries may have advanced financial system to slow the spreading and 
protect themselves from the crisis, whereas the developing countries might lack the financial 
strategy to defend the extreme downside event. Therefore, an effective financial system is 
necessary for each country to make the financial market stable. Regional effect is also 
significant within the benchmark groups that the countries would affect or interact with others 
in the benchmark groups. Additionally, the transmitting order of contagion risk is not 
discussed in this study, but it is an interesting topic to develop further research to find how 
the contagion risk transfer from one country to another. With the process of globalization, 
countries are linked closely by financial assets. Once the financial crisis happens, it would 
sweep the world rapidly. This study has found significant proof in the both crises that 
contagion risk does exist and spread when the extreme negative events come, also indicates 
the advanced financial system could contribute to slow the threat of risk spillover. 
4.4 Limitation 
Certainly, mistakes also play a role in this study. When choosing the stock indices, it would 
be biased by selecting some representatives rather than covering the whole markets. As 
shown in this dissertation, G7 group stands for the developed markets and BRICs are on 
behalf of the emerging markets. However, the representatives cannot stand for all the markets, 
especially for regional economies. For example, including all the European countries into 
Eurozone Crisis would have better results, because simply using developed and emerging 
markets may miss some significant evidences for contagion risk. A range of European 
countries could help to track the crisis process and transmitting order. 
Another place could be improved that is the range of benchmark countries. For convince, the 
countries suffered the most loss or happened serious problem compose the benchmark groups. 
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Although there does exist significant evidence of contagion effect in this study, what the 
crisis originator is and how the crisis transfers into other markets could be explored for 
further research. With the globalization of the economy in recent decades, it would be hard to 
track which country opens the Pandoras Box. Simply using the countries suffered the most 
loss might be an arbitrary decision, and might omit the important information. One solution is 
to include all the samples into cause and effect analysis in turns, which could contribute to 
figure out the originator, process and transmitting order. Meanwhile, whether the crisis has 
effective order is an interesting topic for intensive study that whether the magnitude of crisis 
would be equal when crisis transfer from strong economic entity to weak economic entity and 
from weak economic entity to strong economic entity. An example would make this clear. US 
sub-prime mortgage market crisis rapidly spreads into the financial markets in the world, but 
the effect could not be the same when a crisis happens in Uruguay. Strong economic entity 
could have advanced financial system to slow the effect, while weak economic entity might 
be swamped in the mud directly. This could be an interesting topic to explore the volatility of 
both strong economic entity and weak economic. 
On the other hand, model risk is unavoidable in this study that both distribution and GARCH 
order may affect the results significantly. Even though the E-GARCH (1, 1) VaR model with 
Generalized Error Distribution (GED) is valid for the majority of samples to predict volatility 
accurately, it still cannot fit some selected stock indices, such as Canada S&P/TSX composite 
index (p-values are 0.00651 for Kupiec and 0.00087 for Christoffersen) and Portugal PSI 
Geral index (p-value is 0.01768 for Kupiec) in the Eurozone Crisis; and Indonesia JSX 
Composite (p-values are 0.04792 for Kupiec and 0.01403 for Christoffersen) and Thailand 
SET Index (p-values are 0.00047 for Kupiec and 0.00166 for Christoffersen) in the Asian 
Crisis. This mistake hinges on both distribution and GARCH order. More exactly, other 
GARCH order might have better performance for some selected stock indices (Walid et al., 
2011). In addition, other GARCH family members (standard GARCH, T-GARCH and 
I-GARCH) could also show superiority in the conditional situations. Since the samples hold 
apparent strong skewness and kurtosis, skewed distribution may have advantages than 
Generalized Error Distribution (GED). The alternatives, including Skewed Student-t 
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Distribution, Skewed Generalized Error Distribution and so on, would reflect better results on 
the Backtesting part and contribute to better predictions. However, the aim of this study is to 
focus on testing the contagion risk rather than evaluating the perfect model, so simply 
applying the E-GARCH (1, 1) VaR model with Generalized Error Distribution (GED). 
Further research can compare different models and distributions to find the best model for 
each stock index. 
Limited by time and length, this dissertation cannot cover all the details particularly. 
According to the shortcomings, this study still provides some directions to further research. 
Both the range of samples and model selection can be improved in the future. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
With the global economic integration, different financial markets around the world connect 
each other closely. For this reason, contagion risk is the most serious threat for the financial 
markets as local economy is susceptible by outside effect. When focus on successful risk 
management, it becomes increasingly essential to forecast, control and monitor the contagion 
risk. How to detect and defend the risk spillover and is meaningful for the investors survival. 
Almost all the financial institutions, like insurance companies, banks, pension funds and so 
on, would have motivation to model market risk and should pay attention to the extreme 
downside interaction between the financial markets. Thus, it is important to understand the 
mechanism of contagion effect to guarantee effective and successful risk management and 
investment diversification when the negative events happen. Indeed, risk is expected to 
transmit from one market to another, and spread to the world at last. Large price change in 
one market, like the stock index change in this study, may bring similar large price shifts in 
other markets. Study on contagion risk contributes to build better market risk regulation, as 
well as control the internal risk (Baur, 2003). 
This paper has studied the spread of the both current Eurozone Crisis in 2010 and Asian 
Crisis in 1997 to find the proof of contagion risk. Three groups of samples comprise this 
research that developed countries (G7 group), emerging markets (BRICs countries) and 
benchmark countries (Spain, Portugal and Greece for Eurozone crisis in 2010, while 
Indonesia, Korea and Thailand for Asian financial crisis in 1998). As to compare the 
contagion effect of developed countries and emerging markets, a range of stock indices from 
different countries are selected to bring more evidence to the issue of risk spillover. Each 
period under analysis covers the financial crisis correlated. All the selected stock indices 
suggest the presence of heteroskedasticity. To accommodate these features, E-GARCH (1, 1) 
VaR model with Generalized Error Distribution (GED) is applied to measure the contagion 
risk. In addition, model validation is conducted by Unconditional Coverage Test (Kupiec) as 
well as Conditional Coverage Test (Christoffersen). As expected, E-GARCH (1, 1) VaR 
model with Generalized Error Distribution (GED) is able to fit the majority of samples and 
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give accurate predictions. 
In conclusion, the objective of this study has been to better understand the existence and 
spreading process through the financial crisis, which is concerned at the detection of Granger 
causality in risk between the samples. The results illustrate that both developed countries and 
emerging markets have received significant contagion risk in the Eurozone Crisis. Especially 
for developing countries, they are more likely to be influenced by the benchmark group. This 
study also has identified contagion effect in the Asian Crisis overall. However, the results 
have pointed out some interesting facts that Russia RTS Index is the only one stock index that 
is influenced by benchmark group, whereas most selected stock indices, both developed and 
developing groups, can affect Granger cause the negative shifts in the benchmark countries. 
There is weak evidence for contagion risk, which means the volatility of benchmark countries 
is not responsible for the negative shifts of developed countries. Considering the evidence of 
Asian Crisis, one possible explanation is that some countries (like Russia) may act as transfer 
points to spread the extreme negative events to the global financial markets. Even though 
some markets cannot receive the contagion effect by benchmark group directly, the negative 
shocks could still arrive on these markets through these transfer points. Nonetheless, the 
Asian Crisis in 1997 still provides significant evidence of risk spillover between the 
benchmark countries. 
Comparing results of both Eurozone Crisis and Asian Crisis, emerging market group is more 
likely to be affected by the benchmark volatility than developed country group. Advanced 
financial system would be the successful tool to help developed countries protect themselves 
from the extreme downside shocks, but the developing countries might lack the financial 
strategy to defend the crisis. As a consequence, building an effective financial system is very 
important for each country to make the local economy stable. A key point of this study is that 
regional effect is significant as well within the benchmark groups that regional markets with 
close links would affect or interact with others significantly in the benchmark groups. 
Generally, this study has identified exactly the existence of contagion risk in both crises and 
given explanation for this phenomenon.  
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Unfortunately, this study does not focus on the possible model errors. Limited by time, this 
study cannot cover all the aspects of contagion risk topic as well. Wider range of samples, 
appropriate GARCH model with suitable distribution may improve the modelling results and 
explain the rare biases. According to the shortcomings, future research could focus on the 
topic as transmitting order of contagion risk and appropriate model to fit selected samples. 
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Figure 3 Stock Index of Canada S&P/TSX Composite Index (Eurozone Crisis) 
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Figure 11 Stock Index of Russia RTS Index (Eurozone Crisis) 
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